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The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of 
the Warrantless Surveillance Program 
Kathleen Clark 
ABSTRACT 
This Article identifies mechanisms that help to hold the federal 
government’s executive branch accountable for complying with the law, 
and shows how claims of national security secrecy undermine the 
effectiveness of these accountability mechanisms. It identifies four 
distinct stages in the process of accountability, sets out a typology based 
on the mechanisms’ location inside or outside of government, and 
identifies some of the specific mechanisms that hold the executive branch 
accountable for violations of the law. These multiple overlapping 
mechanisms would appear to constitute a robust system of 
accountability. 
A review of how this system of accountability operated in connection 
with the Bush Administration’s warrantless surveillance program, 
however, reveals that all of these mechanisms share a common 
characteristic, which turns out to be a weakness: a dependence on the 
provision of information. Remove the information, and the entire 
structure of apparently robust accountability collapses. The executive 
branch was able to prevent these multiple accountability mechanisms 
from scrutinizing the warrantless surveillance program by asserting 
national security secrecy. This systematic weakness in the accountability 
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architecture has significant policy implications, including the need to 
recognize a crime-fraud exception to the state secrets privilege. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Several Democratic members of Congress and human rights 
organizations have called for establishing a “truth commission” to 
investigate the Bush Administration’s interrogation and warrantless 
surveillance policies.1 Others advocate criminal investigation and 
even prosecution of Bush Administration officials who authorized 
these policies.2 Republican legislators and some commentators 
oppose any commission or criminal investigation of Bush 
Administration policies, arguing that they would constitute an 
attempt by those currently in power to criminalize their policy 
differences with predecessors.3 President Obama also opposes a truth 
 
 1. See, e.g., Patrick Leahy, The Case for a Truth Commission, TIME, Mar. 2, 2009, at 
25, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1880662,00.html; 
JUAN E. MÉNDEZ ET AL., STATEMENT ON COMMISSION RELATING TO DETENTION, 
TREATMENT, AND TRANSFER OF DETAINEES, http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/ 
file/317.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (endorsed by Amnesty International USA, Human 
Rights First, and sixteen other organizations). While President Bush repeatedly asserted that 
the harsh techniques he authorized did not amount to torture, see, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, 
Bush Defends CIA’s Clandestine Prisons: ‘We Do Not Torture,’ President Says, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 8, 2005, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2005/11/07/AR2005110700637.html, at the end of the Bush Administration, a 
Pentagon official publicly acknowledged that the treatment of at least one prisoner at 
Guantanamo amounted to torture. Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official: 
Trial Overseer Cites ‘Abusive’ Methods Against 9/11 Suspect, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1 
(“‘We tortured [Mohammed al-]Qahtani,’ said Susan J. Crawford, in her first interview since 
being named convening authority of military commissions by Defense Secretary Robert M. 
Gates in February 2007.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Q&A: Jonathan Turley on Holding Bush and Cheney Accountable, posting 
of Tony Mauro to The BLT: The Blog of LegalTimes, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/ 
2008/12/qa-jonathan-turley-on-holding-bush-and-cheney-accountable.html (Dec. 23, 2008, 
13:39 EST). 
 3. Senator Kit Bond stated that a Truth Commission is “‘Third World country-type 
stuff . . . where you go in and prosecute; if you lose an election you get prosecuted.’” Margaret 
Talev & Marisa Taylor, Will Obama Back ‘Truth Commission’ to Probe Bush Practices?, 
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/v-
print/story/62575.html. Stuart Taylor argues that criminal prosecutions would hinder any 
search for truth because witnesses will plead the Fifth Amendment rather than provide 
evidence. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Truth About Torture, NEWSWEEK, July 21, 2008, at 36. 
Kenneth Anderson argues that a “truth commission” would be “little more than political 
payback.” Posting of Kenneth Anderson to New York Times Room for Debate Blog, 
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commission, stating that he prefers to look forward rather than 
backward.4 
Is it necessary or appropriate to hold Bush Administration 
officials accountable for their actions through a criminal or 
commission investigation? This Article contributes to the debate on 
this issue by placing it in a broader theoretical context and by 
examining the degree to which accountability mechanisms operated 
effectively during the Bush Administration. Commission and 
criminal investigations are just two of the many mechanisms that can 
hold the executive branch—and its officials—accountable for 
violations of the law. 
Part II of this Article explains, on the level of theory, what is 
meant by legal accountability and it identifies four distinct stages of 
accountability. On a more concrete level, Part III identifies some of 
the most important mechanisms that hold the U.S. executive branch 
accountable for violations of the law and sets out a typology of those 
mechanisms.5 Part IV examines how those mechanisms operated in 
connection with the Bush Administration’s warrantless surveillance 
of domestic communications. While the legal opinion function 
eventually held the executive branch in check, most of the other 
accountability mechanisms did not operate effectively in connection 
with the warrantless surveillance program because of claims of 
national security secrecy. Part V discusses the implications of this case 
study for evaluating executive branch claims of national security 
secrecy where those claims would undermine accountability. 
II. MEANING OF “ACCOUNTABILITY” 
This Article uses the term, “accountability,” to refer to the 
process of accounting for one’s actions to someone else.6 To fully 
describe the process of accountability, it is necessary to identify: 
 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/a-truth-commission-for-the-bush-
era/?pagemode=print (Mar. 2, 2009, 12:24 EST). 
 4. David Johnson & Charlie Savage, Obama Reluctant to Look Into Bush Programs, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at A1. 
 5. This Article does not address international mechanisms that attempt to hold the 
executive branch accountable for illegal conduct, such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross or the possibility of foreign prosecution of U.S. officials who commit war crimes.  
 6. Rob Jenkins, The Role of Political Institutions in Promoting Accountability, in 
PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMBATING CORRUPTION 135, 136 (Anwar Shah ed., 
2007); see also Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of 
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999) (“[A]ccountability refers to the implicit 
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 the party giving the account or explaining its conduct 
(the accountor), 
 the party who receives the account (the account-
recipient7), 
 the type of information provided, 
 the processes used, and 
 the possible consequences available.8 
The focus of the accounting might be compliance with legal norms, 
an employer’s norms, social norms, or moral norms.9 This Article 
addresses legal accountability: whether the federal government’s 
executive branch complies with the law and the mechanisms that 
monitor such compliance.10 For the purposes of this Article, the 
accountor may be the executive branch itself, a particular agency 
within the executive branch, or an executive branch official. Some 
accountability mechanisms—such as a civil lawsuit—can operate 
directly against the executive branch or indirectly on the executive 
branch through an officeholder. The account-recipient may be a 
governmental body, such as an Inspector General, a congressional 
committee, or a court; or may be an outside institution, such as the 
press. The information generally includes facts regarding the 
accountor’s actions, the surrounding circumstances, and arguments 
about whether those actions were proper. 
The process of accountability has four distinct stages. The first 
stage is informing: the accountor provides information relating to its 
conduct. Informing can occur through self-reporting, where the 
accountor voluntarily provides this information, or through discovery, 
where the account-recipient is in a position to require the accountor 
 
or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one's beliefs, feelings, and actions to 
others . . . .”). 
 7. Mark Bovens refers to the account-recipient as the account-forum. Mark Bovens, 
Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, 13 EUR. L.J. 447, 450–51 
(2007). Other authors refer to it as account-holder. 
 8. Jerry Louis Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the 
Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND 
EXPERIENCES 115, 120 (Michael Dowdle ed., 2006) (identifying the final component as 
identifying possible sanctions); Bovens, supra note 7, at 451–52 (referring to “consequences” 
rather than “sanctions.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 8, at 119 (discussing legal, market-based and social 
accountability regimes). 
 10. Cf. Bovens, supra note 7, at 456 (defining “legal accountability” as accountability 
rendered through court proceedings).  
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to provide the information.11 The second stage is justification, where 
the accountor attempts to defend the legality of its conduct. The 
third stage is evaluation, where the account-recipient evaluates the 
accountor’s conduct. And the final stage is rectification, an account-
recipient’s response (such as a penalty or other remedy) when it is 
dissatisfied with the proffered justification.12 Rectification may serve 
any of several distinct purposes: incapacitation (preventing the 
officeholder from engaging in similar activity by removing him from 
office), deterrence (punishing the officeholder in order to deter him 
or other officeholders from engaging in similar activity), 
compensation (paying those harmed by the illegal conduct for the 
harm they suffered), or symbolic expression (authoritatively stating 
that what occurred was illegal).13  
Some accountability mechanisms include multiple stages of 
accountability. Civil lawsuits, for example, involve discovery, 
justification, evaluation, and rectification. Other mechanisms, such as 
the Freedom of Information Act and mandatory reporting statutes, 
involve only a single stage, providing only partial accountability.14 A 
single mechanism that provides only partial accountability may work 
in concert with other mechanisms to effectuate all four stages of 
accountability.  
III. TYPOLOGY OF ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Accountability mechanisms can build on each other, such as 
when the leak of a controversial Justice Department memo and 
investigative journalists’ news stories led to more intensive 
 
 11. Cf. Mashaw, supra note 8, at 118–19 (referring to self-reporting and discovery as 
two distinct stages of accountability). Mark Bovens has adopted a narrower definition of 
accountability, including only those mechanisms in which the accountor is obligated to 
disclose information. Bovens, supra note 7, at 450. 
 12. Other writers have divided the accountability process differently. Rob Jenkins refers 
to both discovery and justification as “answerability.” Jenkins, supra note 6, at 138–39. 
Richard Mulgan includes justification in the self-reporting stage. Richard Mulgan, The Processes 
of Public Accountability, 56 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 25, 27 (1997) (“reporting . . . may . . . 
involve explanation and justification of actions that have been taken”). 
 13. Cf. Jon Elster, Accountability in Athenian Politics, in DEMOCRACY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 253, 276 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999) (“I 
have distinguished between two purposes of accountability: incapacitation and deterrence.”). 
 14. See Mulgan, supra note 12, at 26. 
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congressional scrutiny of executive branch treatment of prisoners;15 
or can interfere with each other, such as when an investigating 
congressional committee grants use immunity to a witness invoking 
the Fifth Amendment, and that immunity undermines the ability to 
prosecute that witness.16 In evaluating the effectiveness of the various 
accountability mechanisms, we need to be cognizant of the fact that 
a mechanism may be effective even if it operates at only one of the 
four stages of accountability. A Freedom of Information Act 
disclosure will not by itself remedy illegal activity by the executive 
branch. But such a disclosure may nonetheless be an integral part of 
the entire accountability process if there are other mechanisms that 
evaluate the government’s justification for its action and can seek a 
remedy for any wrongdoing.17 
To get a handle on the range of accountability mechanisms that 
can hold the executive branch accountable for complying with the 
law, this section sets out a typology of them, based on their location, 
ranging from those that are: 
(A) entirely internal to the executive branch (such as legal 
opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel);  
(B) entirely external to the executive branch (such as 
investigations by congressional committees); and 
(C) located (at least partially) within the executive branch, but 
acting pursuant to a congressional mandate. 
Thus, this Article distinguishes mechanisms that are purely internal 
executive branch mechanisms from those that are located in the 
 
 15. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of 
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1013 (2008). 
 16. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reversing John 
Poindexter’s convictions because prosecution witnesses had reviewed his immunized testimony 
before the congressional Iran-Contra Committee); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 
(D.C. Cir. 1990), modified on reh’g, 920 F. 2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (vacating Oliver North’s 
conviction on the same grounds); LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS (1993) (noting that the Court of 
Appeals decisions “‘makes a subsequent trial of any congressionally immunized witness 
virtually impossible’” (quoting United States v. North, 910 F.2d at 924 (Wald, C.J., 
dissenting))). 
 17. Mulgan, supra note 12, at 31, 35 (recommending a “multi-channelled approach to 
public accountability,” and noting that “there is no reason to expect any one institution to 
fulfil [sic] all the functions of accountability”). 
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executive branch but have been created by Congress through 
statutory enactments.18 
A. Accountability Mechanisms that are Entirely                              
Internal to the Executive Branch 
The prototypical accountability mechanism may well be the 
congressional investigation of the executive branch, with that branch 
having to explain and justify to someone outside of itself its 
conduct.19 But certain accountability mechanisms are entirely 
internal to the executive branch. This section describes two of those 
mechanisms: legal opinions and internal investigations.  
1. Legal opinions 
One example of a purely executive branch accountability 
mechanism is the practice of obtaining a legal opinion about 
questionable conduct prior to engaging in that conduct. Under the 
Constitution, the President can require a written opinion from the 
head of each department,20 and by statute, Congress requires the 
 
 18. Others who have examined accountability mechanisms have missed this important 
distinction. For example, in a 2006 essay, Neal Katyal indicated that he would outline “a set of 
mechanisms that create checks and balances within the executive branch,” and he identified 
four such mechanisms: 
 overlapping jurisdiction among departments (e.g., State and Defense Department) 
which may cause them to have competing conceptions of proper policy; 
 requirements that the executive branch report particular information to Congress; 
 civil service protection for most employees, insulating them from partisan political 
control; and 
 a dissent channel for State Department employees who disagree with current policy. 
Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch 
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006). But the first three of these mechanisms have 
their origin in Congress, not in the executive branch. Congress sets out in statute the 
jurisdiction of each of the cabinet departments, so jurisdictional overlap is the result of 
congressional action. Congress also created civil service protection and the reporting 
requirements, which usually require that the information be delivered straight to Congress. So 
while these three mechanisms are located in the executive branch, they are by no means purely 
internal to the executive branch. Only the State Department’s dissent channel is purely internal 
to the executive branch, established by Department regulations rather than by statute and with 
reports staying within the Department. See 2 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
MANUAL 070 (1998). The dissent channel is limited to dissent on substantive foreign policy 
issues, and is not for concerns about alleged violations of law. Id. at 071.2. 
 19. See MORTON ROSENBERG, INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY (1995), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-464.pdf. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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Attorney General to provide legal advice to the President and other 
department heads.21 By regulation, the Attorney General has 
delegated this responsibility to the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).22  
The practice of obtaining legal advice can help ensure that an 
actor stays within the limits of the law. If an agency wishes to engage 
in particular action and requests a legal opinion from OLC, it may 
learn that the proposed action would be illegal. Looking at this 
situation through the lens of accountability, the agency involved is 
the accountor and OLC is the account-recipient. This opinion-
writing function partakes of several different stages of accountability: 
self-reporting (when an agency provides OLC with information 
about its proposed conduct), discovery (if the Justice Department 
seeks additional information about the proposed conduct), 
justification (if the agency provides an argument for the legality of its 
proposed action), and evaluation (when OLC evaluates that 
proposed justification and decides whether the proposed action is 
legal).  
While courts and commentators generally assume that allowing a 
client to keep legal advice secret helps to ensure that clients comply 
with the law,23 recent history shows that such secrecy can be 
perverted to facilitate wrongdoing and undermine legal 
accountability. In 2002, OLC issued a legal opinion concluding that 
despite Congress’s enactment of a criminal law prohibiting torture, 
executive branch officials could nonetheless legally torture prisoners 
as long as the President authorized it.24 Both during its drafting and 
after it was issued, this opinion was closely held within the executive 
branch. By limiting internal circulation of the opinion, the Bush 
Administration was able to delay the leaking of its improper conduct 
and limit internal criticism.25 A 2009 Justice Department report 
 
 21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 511–12 (2006). 
 22. 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(a) (2010).  
 23. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (asserting that the attorney-
client privilege “promote[s the] broader public interest[] in the observance of law”); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (“Courts frequently have asserted the argument that the 
privilege furthers societal interests in law compliance . . . .”). But see Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers 
and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1998) (criticizing Upjohn’s analysis). 
 24. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Asst. Atty. General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
 25. See infra Part III.C.2.b. (internal whistleblowing). 
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noted that internal circulation and review of the opinion were 
“deficient,” that the limitations on circulating the opinion “were, in 
part, based on the limited number of security clearances granted to 
review the materials,” and that “[t]his denial of clearances to 
individuals who routinely handle highly classified materials has never 
been explained satisfactorily.”26 Until the opinion was leaked, the 
Bush Administration was able to rely on the opinion as the basis for 
its policy of torturing prisoners allegedly connected to al Qaeda, and 
effectively immunize government officials from later prosecution for 
their actions.27 Eventually, the Washington Post obtained the 
opinion and, on June 14, 2004, published it on its website.28 There 
was an immediate public uproar because of the opinion’s dubious 
legal justification of torture and extreme claims about executive 
power.29 Nine days after the Washington Post published the opinion, 
the Justice Department officially withdrew it,30 eventually replacing it 
with a more narrowly drawn opinion.31 But until it was leaked, the 
secrecy of the 2002 opinion enabled the Bush Administration to 
subvert this accountability mechanism, transforming it from a 
mechanism preventing illegality to one enabling it.32 
2. Internal investigations 
Another accountability-related practice involves conducting an 
internal investigation to determine whether there has been 
wrongdoing. Internal investigations generally partake of several 
 
 26. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Report: Investigation into the 
Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 259–60 
(2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf. 
 27. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Time Bomb, in THE TORTURE 
DEBATE IN AMERICA 35, 55–57 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006). 
 28. See David Ignatius, Small Comfort, WASH. POST, June 15, 2004, at A23. 
 29. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark & Julie Mertus, Torturing the Law: The Justice Department’s 
Legal Contortions on Interrogation, WASH. POST, June 20, 2004, at B03. For a more detailed 
critique of the opinion, see Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture 
Memorandum, 1 J.L. & NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y. 455 (2005). 
 30. Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics Is Disavowed: Justice 
Document Had Said Torture May Be Defensible, WASH. POST, June 23, 2004, at A01. 
 31. Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, from Daniel Levin, 
Acting Asst. Attorney General, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (Dec. 
30, 2004). 
 32. See Sudha Setty, No More Secrets Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal 
Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 593 (2009). 
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stages of accountability: discovery (when an agency investigates 
allegations of wrongdoing by interviewing witnesses and gathering 
evidence), justification (when agency officials provide an argument 
for the legality of their past action), and evaluation (when the 
investigator analyzes the legality of the conduct, advises another 
executive branch official about factual and legal conclusions, and 
recommends a response).33 In many executive branch agencies, 
Congress has created a specific office—the Inspector General—to 
conduct such investigations of alleged wrongdoing.34 However, even 
executive branch agencies that lack an Inspector General can conduct 
their own internal investigations. For example, after the Clinton 
Administration fired seven White House travel office employees, 
there were allegations that the firings had been motivated by a desire 
to outsource travel services to an Arkansas company with ties to the 
Clintons. The White House responded by conducting an internal 
investigation, resulting in an 80-page public report and reprimands 
against four White House officials.35 
An example of a national security-related internal investigation 
was the CIA’s 1973 investigation of its own illegal conduct. 
Prompted by press reports that the CIA had provided assistance to 
Watergate burglars, CIA Director James Schlesinger sent a 
memorandum to all CIA employees, directing them to report on all 
CIA activities that “might be construed to be outside the legislative 
charter of this Agency.”36 This investigation resulted in a nearly 700-
page report (known as the “Family Jewels”) detailing illegal 
activities.37 
 
 33. Internal investigations occur in the private sector as well, and federal law has given 
private sector organizations an incentive to engage in and set up an institutional structure for 
such internal investigations in order to ferret out wrongdoing. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2009) (requiring organizations to establish effective 
compliance and ethics programs); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 
Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 34. See discussion of Inspectors General, infra Part III.C.1. 
 35. Thomas L. Friedman, White House Rebukes 4 In Travel Office Shake-Up, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 3, 1993, at 11. 
 36. James R. Schlesinger, Memorandum for All CIA Employees (May 9, 1973), 
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/schlesinger_jewels. 
pdf. 
 37. National Security Archive, The CIA’s Family Jewels, http://www.gwu.edu/~ 
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm. This report became known as the “Family 
Jewels.” CIA Releases Two Collections of Historical Documents, June 26, 2007, 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2007 
/cia-releases-two-collections-of-historical-documents.html (indicating that this collection of 
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An internal executive branch institution that has the potential to 
serve as an accountability mechanism is the Justice Department’s 
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). OPR was created in 
1975 in response to the “ethical abuses and misconduct by 
Department of Justice officials in the Watergate scandal,” and 
investigates allegations relating to the professional ethics, 
competence, and integrity of Justice Department attorneys.38 If OPR 
finds misconduct, it recommends a range of punishments for the 
attorney’s supervisor to impose and “ordinarily” informs state bar 
disciplinary authorities of its finding.39 In the past, OPR disclosed 
summaries of the cases where it found professional misconduct and 
issued annual reports with statistical data. But under the Bush 
Administration, OPR stopped providing such summaries, and its last 
annual report was for the fiscal year ending in September of 2007.40 
OPR investigations can entail long delays, and the head of OPR, 
who is appointed by the Attorney General, lacks the independence 
and stature of an arguably more effective account-holder, the Justice 
Department’s Inspector General, who is appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness 
of OPR because it usually keeps the results of its investigations 
secret. Recently, however, OPR teamed up with the Justice 
Department’s Inspector General (IG) to investigate politicized hiring 
and firing at the Justice Department, producing four public 
reports.41 The investigation found that Justice Department officials 
 
documents is referred to as the “Family Jewels”). Another momentous national security-related 
internal investigation, the multi-volume history of the Vietnam War (the “Pentagon Papers”), 
focused not on illegality, as such, but on policy missteps. DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE 
PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 19–21 (1996) (discussing 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s motivations for commissioning the study). 
 38. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (July 25, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/poland 
proc.htm [hereinafter OPR POLICIES & PROCEDURES]; Office of Professional Responsibility 
Organizational Chart, http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/opr.htm#orgchart. 
 39. OPR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 38. 
 40. See Richard B. Schmitt, More Scrutiny, Secrecy at Justice, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2008, 
at A14 (noting that in 2001, the Justice Department reversed its policy of publicly disclosing 
summaries of cases where OPR found professional misconduct); OPR Annual Reports Home 
Page, http://www.justice.gov/opr/reports.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2009). 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED 
HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opr/oig-opr-iaph-crd.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opr/us-att-firings-rpt092308.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF 
DO NOT DELETE 4/12/2010 2:46 PM 
357 The Architecture of Accountability 
 369 
had violated federal law by improperly considering job candidates’ 
political and ideological affiliation when hiring for career positions. 
They identified specific officials who had engaged in wrongdoing, 
and recommended changing certain Department policies to make 
recurrence less likely.42 
This kind of purely internal executive branch investigation has a 
significant advantage. Claims of national security secrecy will not 
prevent the investigator from gathering the relevant information if a 
high-level executive branch official commissions the investigation.43 
A downside, however, is that the results may be closely held within 
the executive branch. Most of the “Family Jewels” were kept secret 
for more than three decades, and some of the information is still 
secret.44 Also, if the person directing the internal investigation has a 
vested interest in finding no illegality, the investigation may turn out 
to be—or be perceived as—a “whitewash.”45 
B. Accountability Mechanisms that are Entirely                           
External to the Executive Branch 
Some accountability mechanisms are entirely external to the 
executive branch. These include some entirely extra-governmental 
 
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA 
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2008) 
(hereinafter POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opr/goodling072408.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN 
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
HONORS PROGRAM AND SUMMER LAW INTERN PROGRAM (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opr/oig-opr-investigation-hire-slip.pdf. 
 42. See, e.g., POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING, supra note 41, at 135–39. 
 43. Cf. infra Part III.C (discussing a security clearance issue which stymied the Justice 
Department Inspector General’s investigation of NSA’s domestic spying operation). 
 44. See David Corn, Where’s the CIA’s Missing Jewel?, THE NATION, CAPITAL GAMES 
BLOG, http://www.thenation.com/blogs/capitalgames/208296 (June 26, 2007, 17:25 
EST). 
 45. After the Justice Department’s disastrous 1993 raid on the Branch Davidian 
compound in Waco, Texas, the Department conducted an internal investigation, EDWARD S.G. 
DENNIS, JR., EVALUATION OF THE HANDLING OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIAN STAND-OFF IN 
WACO, TEXAS: FEBRUARY 28 TO APRIL 19, 1993 (1993), but it was perceived by some to be a 
whitewash of departmental wrongdoing. See The Waco Whitewash, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1993, 
at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/12/opinion/the-waco-whitewash. 
html?pagewanted=1. Eventually, after revelations that the earlier investigation failed to uncover 
all relevant information, the Department brought in an outsider to conduct another 
investigation. See JOHN C. DANFORTH, INTERIM REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY 
GENERAL CONCERNING THE 1993 CONFRONTATION AT THE MT. CARMEL COMPLEX WACO, 
TEXAS, at ii (2000), available at http://www.cesnur.org/testi/DanforthRpt.pdf. 
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bodies, such as the press and nongovernmental organizations, but 
many are located in the legislative branch.46 This section discusses 
some of those mechanisms.  
Members of Congress have several tools to bring the executive 
branch to account. For instance, Congress has the ability to gather 
information about the executive branch, both informally—through, 
for example, written requests to an executive branch official for 
answers to particular questions—and formally through Committee 
investigation with subpoenas for public testimony and the disclosure 
of documents. Other Congress-based accountability mechanisms 
include impeachment, investigation and reporting by the 
Government Accountability Office, and statutory causes of action 
against the executive branch or executive branch officials.47  
1. Committee oversight 
Congressional committee oversight has been a key accountability 
mechanism since 1946, when Congress passed legislation directing 
committees to engage in oversight activities.48 Committee oversight 
 
 46. In theory, elections could serve as a legal accountability mechanism for a first-term 
president, or even for a second term president who wishes to see his party continue to control 
the executive branch. See RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 45 (2003) (“Elections set the outer limits of 
acceptable government behavior . . . .”). But their primary focus is political accountability 
rather than legal accountability. Id. at 41–44. In addition, “voters think of elections much 
more as opportunities to try to select good types” rather than as a method of holding elected 
officials accountable. James D. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: 
Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, 
AND REPRESENTATION 55, 82 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999); see also Edward Rubin, The 
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2079 
(2005) (“[I]ntermittent, highly contested elections are simply very poor devices for holding a 
person accountable. Most electoral democracies present the voters with only two or three 
realistic choices, which means that a multitude of issues must map into a small decision set.”). 
 47. Congressional oversight can be divided into direct oversight, which refers to the 
review of executive branch activities by congressional appropriations and authorizing 
committees, and indirect oversight, which refers to the many mechanisms by which Congress 
enables other actors to review executive branch activities, including establishment of the 
Government Accountability Office and Inspectors General, requirements that the executive 
branch disclose information about its activities, and the authorization of private causes of 
action against the executive branch. For a description of “fire-alarm oversight,” see Mathew D. 
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire 
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
 48. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: 
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 205, 207 (citing the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 
Stat. 832 (1946) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 190(d) (1982))). 
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can partake of all stages of accountability: informing (through 
hearings, subpoenas, and informal information requests), justification 
(when agency officials argue for the legality of past action), 
evaluation (when the committee issues a report assessing whether the 
executive branch has violated the law), and rectification (when 
Congress enacts legislation in response). The primary function of 
committee oversight processes is to gather information about 
executive branch activities, which Congress can then use to 
administer course corrections if necessary. 
Committee oversight is often a powerful tool for gathering 
information from the executive branch, but it comes with special 
challenges. While Congress may use its contempt power and court 
processes to obtain information from those outside the executive 
branch, its ability to compel disclosure from the executive branch is 
more circumscribed.49 Every year, the executive branch issues 
thousands of reports to Congress as mandated by statute and 
provides additional information in response to specific congressional 
requests.50 But at times, the executive branch successfully resists 
congressional attempts to obtain sensitive information, such as that 
relating to intelligence or protected by a privilege. Where there is 
conflict regarding congressional information requests, Congress and 
the executive branch usually come to an accommodation.51 
Sometimes Congress gets the information it seeks, but not always. In 
addition, executive branch officials sometimes provide misleading 
responses to congressional requests for information, which can 
frustrate Congress’s oversight efforts, particularly if the deception 
goes unpunished.52 
 
 49. See generally MORTON ROSENBERG & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONGRESS’S 
CONTEMPT POWER: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34097.pdf. 
 50. See CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORTS TO BE MADE TO 
CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 110-4 (2007) (indicating that the Congress required the President 
and cabinet agencies to issue 3,066 reports to Congress); Memorandum from Adam 
Hilkemann, Research Assistant, Wash. U. in St. Louis Sch. of Law, to author, Re: Number of 
Mandatory Reports to Congress from the Executive Branch (June 10, 2008) (on file with author) 
(indicating that in 2007, Congress required the executive branch to provide over 3000 reports 
to Congress). 
 51. See generally Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to 
Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (1992). 
 52. A related issue is whether executive branch officials are held accountable for 
misleading Congress. Several criminal statutes prohibit misleading Congress, but only the 
executive branch can bring criminal prosecutions against those who violate those statutes. In 
the last sixty years, nineteen executive branch officials have been prosecuted for misleading 
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Executive branch officials can justify their actions by testifying at 
congressional hearings or writing letters to Congress, and Congress 
can evaluate the proposed justification. If Congress concludes that 
the executive branch has engaged in wrongdoing, it may be able to 
“generate overwhelming political pressure” for the executive branch 
to take corrective action,53 or it can require executive action by 
enacting a statutory mandate. For example, in the wake of a 
congressional investigation of the Bush Administration’s firing of 
nine U.S. Attorneys, Congress enacted a new statute limiting the 
President’s ability to replace U.S. Attorneys without consulting 
Congress.54 At the extreme, if presidential wrongdoing is so serious 
that it would constitute “high crimes or misdemeanors,” Congress 
has the option of impeaching and removing the President.55  
In general, congressional committee oversight may be more 
robust or intensive when the political party that opposes the 
President controls Congress.56 Recent history seems to be consistent 
 
Congress. See infra APPENDIX. Most of those cases were brought by prosecutors who were not 
under the political control of the President: Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski 
prosecuted three of them and Independent Counsels prosecuted nine others. Id. A politically 
independent prosecutor was available during only about a third of that time period. The Office 
of Watergate Special Prosecutor existed from 1973 until 1976, and the Independent Counsel 
statute was authorized for a five-year term on four occasions, for a total of 20 years. Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. § 591 (2006)); Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–
409, 2, 96 Stat. 2039 (1982); Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 100–191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987); Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103–270, 108 Stat. 732 (1994). The disproportionate share of prosecutions by 
politically independent prosecutors suggests that the Justice Department is ordinarily 
disinclined to prosecute executive branch officials for misleading Congress. 
 53. MULGAN, supra note 46, at 62; see also id. at 54–55 (“Legislative committees . . . 
lack the final power of rectification, except indirectly through the force of publicity and 
political pressure.”). 
 54. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY MAJORITY STAFF REPORT TO 
CHAIRMAN JOHN CONYERS, JR., REINING IN THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH 13 (Jan. 13, 
2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/IPres090113.pdf. 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 56. See generally David C.W. Parker & Matthew M. Dull, Divided We Quarrel: The 
Politics of Congressional Investigations, 1947–2004, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 319 (2009) (explaining 
that divided government is associated with an increase in the number of congressional 
investigations). But see DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, 
LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2002, at 31 (2005) (explaining that divided 
government does not increase the number of high profile congressional investigations). 
Brendan Nyhan has conducted a particularly rigorous analysis of this empirical question, and 
noted that the Independent Counsel statute likely had a confounding effect on the question. 
Brendan Nyhan, Does Divided Government Increase Presidential Scandal? (unpublished paper 
DO NOT DELETE 4/12/2010 2:46 PM 
357 The Architecture of Accountability 
 373 
with that conclusion. The level of congressional oversight jumped 
significantly when the opposition Democrats took control of 
Congress after the 2006 mid-term elections.57  
Ordinarily, both appropriations and authorizing committees 
within the House and Senate review executive branch activities and 
receive information about major initiatives through the budget 
process. The proposed budget is available not just to all members of 
Congress, but also to the public generally, and can be an important 
source of information about the workings of the executive branch. 
An important exception, however, is the budget for intelligence 
operations. The intelligence budget is hidden within the Defense 
Department budget, and only the House and Senate Intelligence 
committees—not the appropriations committees—receive 
information about the intelligence budget.58 Only the members and 
staff of the Intelligence Committees get to see the actual numbers 
for the intelligence budget. 
2. Government Accountability Office investigations 
A key congressional institution, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) engages in two distinct activities that help to hold the 
executive branch accountable for complying with the law.59 First, it 
issues decisions in bid protests by government contractors claiming 
that the executive branch violated the law in awarding a contract to a 
competitor. Second, GAO conducts investigations of and issues 
reports about executive branch programs at the request of 
 
delivered at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (on file 
with author). 
 57. Thomas E. Mann, Molly Reynolds, & Peter Hoey, Op-Chart: A New, Improved 
Congress?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at WK, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/08/26/opinion/26mann.html (providing a chart showing approximately 50% increase 
in oversight hearings during first six months of 110th Congress (controlled by opposition 
Democratic party) in comparison with the first six months of 109th Congress (controlled by 
the President’s Republican party)). 
 58. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: 
Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049 (2008). 
 59. The GAO changed its name from General Accounting Office to Government 
Accountability Office in 2004. See David M. Walker, GAO Answers the Question: What’s in a 
Name?, ROLL CALL, July 19, 2004, available at http://www.gao.gov/about/rollcall 
07192004.pdf. While the President nominates the head of the GAO, the Comptroller General, 
the Supreme Court considers the Comptroller General to be outside the executive branch 
because he can be removed not just by impeachment but also through a congressional joint 
resolution. See generally Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
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congressional committee and subcommittee chairs and ranking 
members.60  
Like internal executive branch investigations, GAO investigations 
partake of the first three stages of accountability: informing, 
justification, and evaluation. GAO cannot directly rectify any 
wrongdoing it detects, but its reports can form part of a chain of 
accountability, enabling Congress to put pressure on agencies for 
rectification.61 By statute, if the Executive Branch decides not to 
follow a GAO bid protest recommendation, it must promptly report 
this decision to the Comptroller General, who then must inform the 
relevant congressional committees and recommend further action.62  
While most of GAO’s investigative reports focus on issues of 
financial efficiency, some of them address the executive branch’s 
compliance with the law.63 For example, one GAO report examined 
whether agencies were complying with FOIA’s requirement that 
agencies disclose in the federal register basic information about their 
organization and operations. The report found twenty instances of 
failure to make such disclosures, fourteen of which were being 
remedied by the agencies themselves after discussions with GAO by 
the time GAO published its report.64 Another example includes a 
GAO report examining whether Curt Hebert, Jr., the Chairman of 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), violated federal 
statutes or regulations in his communications with Kenneth Lay, the 
chairman of Enron, whose company was regulated by FERC.65 A 
New York Times article had detailed a phone conversation between 
Hebert and Lay in which Hebert requested Lay’s political support 
and Lay asked that Hebert change his view on a FERC policy, raising 
 
 60. In the 2008 fiscal year, GAO produced over 1200 reports or written testimony, 
mostly at the request of congressional committees or subcommittee chairs and ranking 
members. See Homeland Security Digital Library, New GAO Performance & Accountability 
Report for FY 2008, http://www.hsdl.org/hslog/?=node/4489 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
 61. See MULGAN, supra note 46, at 87. 
 62. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3554(b)(3), (e)(1) (2006). 
 63. Telephone Interview with James Lager, Deputy Ethics Counselor, GAO (Feb. 6, 
2009). 
 64. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS (1986). This example 
illustrates the discovery, evaluation, and rectification stages of accountability.  
 65. See Letter from Robert H. Hast, Managing Director, Office of Special 
Investigations, to Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, Committee on Governmental 
Affairs (Aug. 16, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hast Letter], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011020r.pdf. 
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the specter of possible solicitation to bribery.66 GAO interviewed 
Hebert, Lay, and two FERC employees who overheard Hebert’s part 
of the conversation, and concluded that there was no violation of 
either criminal law or ethics regulations.67  
By statute, the GAO has the ability to extract information from 
the executive branch agencies, but that statute excepts from such 
mandatory disclosure any records related to intelligence activities.68 
Since the early 1960s, the CIA has effectively shut the GAO out 
from conducting any oversight functions regarding its activities.69 In 
fact, from the creation of the Senate and House Intelligence 
Committees in the 1970s, the executive branch has argued that 
those committees are the exclusive vehicles for congressional 
oversight.70 More recently, the Director of National Intelligence has 
taken a similar approach, arguing that oversight of intelligence 
functions is beyond the purview of the GAO.71 In addition, the 
Executive Branch has argued that while GAO has authority to 
evaluate executive branch work that is done pursuant to statutes, it 
lacks authority to evaluate executive branch work done pursuant to 
the President’s constitutional authority, thus exempting wide swaths 
of foreign policy and intelligence-related activities from GAO 
scrutiny.72   
 
 66. Lowell Bergman & Jeff Gerth, Power Trader Tied to Bush Finds Washington All 
Ears, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2001/05/25/politics/25POWE.html?pagewanted=1. 
 67. See Hast Letter, supra note 65. 
 68. 31 U.S.C. § 716(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 69. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: 
OBSERVATIONS ON GAO ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND CIA PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES 
(2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_hr/071801_hinton.pdf. 
 70. Id. at 3 (“The CIA has maintained that the Congress intended the intelligence 
committees to be the exclusive means of oversight of the CIA, effectively precluding oversight 
by [the GAO].”); see also Investigative Authority of the General Accounting Office, 12 Op. 
Off. Legal Counsel 171 (1988). 
 71. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION SHARING: THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO ESTABLISH POLICIES AND PROCESSES FOR SHARING TERRORISM-
RELATED AND SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION 29 (2006), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06385.pdf. The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence refused to comment on GAO’s draft report, stating that “the review of intelligence 
activities is beyond GAO’s purview.” Id. 
 72. See generally Investigative Authority of the General Accounting Office, 12 Op. Off. 
Legal Counsel 171 (1988). 
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3. Intervention by a member of Congress on behalf of constituents 
Members of Congress sometimes take action on behalf of 
individual constituents who have been aggrieved by executive branch 
agencies. This is accountability at the retail level rather than at the 
wholesale level. The concern is not whether an entire policy is legal, 
but whether the executive branch’s treatment of one particular 
constituent is legal. In some ways similar to a civil lawsuit, this type 
of activity partakes of all four stages of accountability. The member 
(or her staffer) may initially seek more information from the agency 
(roughly analogous to the discovery process), and may eventually 
address legal arguments to the agency on behalf of the constituent 
(roughly analogous to legal argument addressed to a judge). Unlike 
litigation, however, the persuasiveness of the argument may be 
enhanced by the stature of the member of Congress and the degree 
to which the agency is beholden to that member. Thus, intervention 
on behalf of a constituent may not only reflect an effort to rectify a 
legal wrong by the executive branch, but may instead reflect a 
political effort to convince an executive branch official to reverse a 
decision that disfavored the constituent.  
C. Accountability Mechanisms Located in Executive                      
Branch but Based on Congressional Action 
This section examines accountability mechanisms that are located 
in the executive branch, but that were created by congressional 
action. It divides these statutorily-created mechanisms into two 
categories: those that involve only executive branch actors, and those 
that also involve actors outside the executive branch. Accountability 
mechanisms within the executive branch include Inspectors General 
(IGs) who conduct regular audits and investigate alleged 
wrongdoing in 60 executive branch agencies, and Ombudspersons, 
who mediate disputes.73 Mechanisms that involve nonexecutive 
actors include the Freedom of Information Act, protections for 
whistleblowers, and specially created investigative commissions. 
 
 73. Some federal ombudspersons have been created by the executive branch itself 
through regulation rather than by Congress through statute. 
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1. Congressionally created mechanisms within the executive branch 
 a. Inspectors General. Over the objection of the executive 
branch,74 Congress created Inspectors General and gave them the 
authority to receive confidential tips about waste, fraud, and abuse, 
and to directly access all of an agency’s records to investigate those 
tips and other allegations.75 Every six months IGs issue detailed 
reports to the agency head and Congress.76 When IGs discover 
“particularly serious or flagrant problems” within the agency, they 
must report immediately to the agency head, who must forward that 
report to Congress.77 IG reports have become a particularly 
important source of information for congressional committees 
investigating the executive branch.78 IGs can recommend sanctions 
against particular employees and changes in administrative processes, 
but cannot impose either.79 So IG investigations partake in the 
discovery, justification, and evaluation stages of accountability, but 
not rectification. On the other hand, the publicity that accompanies 
issuance of an IG report can result in rectification through legislative 
change.80 For example, after concerns were raised about the FBI’s 
extensive use of National Security Letters (NSLs) to collect 
information, Congress required the Justice Department IG to audit 
 
 74. FREDERICK M. KAISER, STATUTORY OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: PAST AND 
PRESENT, at CRS-4 (2007), available at https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/ 
10207/19765/98-379_20070621.pdf?sequence=2; PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING 
GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 39, 62–63 
(1993) (“[A]ll twelve departments covered by the [Inspector General Act of 1978] testified in 
opposition [to it].”). In addition to ferreting out waste, fraud, and abuse, Inspectors General 
also make recommendations on how agencies can increase their efficiency and effectiveness. Id.  
 75. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6 (2006)). But see 50 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 8D, 8E (permitting 
Treasury Secretary and Attorney General to restrict IGs’ access to information relating to 
ongoing investigations, confidential sources, and other matters). 
 76. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5. 
 77. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(d). 
 78. LIGHT, supra note 74, at 56 (quoting “a key legislative player” as stating that “IGs 
gave us . . . someone who would give us regular input through the semi-annual reports and 
irregular access [to information] through the development of good working relationships”). 
 79. For example, during the Reagan Administration, the IG at the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) discovered serious problems with the operation of a 
program related to Section 8 housing and recommended suspending that program. HUD 
Secretary Samuel Pierce refused to suspend the program, which spawned a massive scandal and 
Independent Counsel investigation of criminal wrongdoing. LIGHT, supra note 74, at 69. 
 80. In addition, something akin to rectification occurs when the agency adopts the IG’s 
recommendations. 
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the FBI’s use of NSLs.81 Those audits revealed widespread problems 
in the FBI’s administration of NSLs82 and helped spur legislation 
cutting back the FBI’s authority to issue them.83  
There are two different classes of statutorily created IGs—those 
who require presidential nomination with Senate confirmation and 
those who are appointed by heads of departments. The President 
nominates and the Senate confirms IGs in all fifteen cabinet 
departments and in fourteen other federal agencies.84 In thirty-one 
smaller agencies and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, IGs are appointed by department heads.85 The 
Inspector General Act directs the President and department heads to 
select IGs on the basis of their expertise and without regard to 
political affiliation.86 They generally have independence in how they 
conduct their work,87 but on occasion, Congress has responded to 
specific allegations of wrongdoing by requiring IGs to investigate 
 
 81. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 119, 120 Stat. 192, 219 (2006). 
 82. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, A REVIEW OF THE 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS (2007), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S 
USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND 
EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/ 
special/s0803b/final.pdf. 
 83. After the first Inspector General report, Representative Jerrold Nadler introduced a 
bill to place limits on the use of National Security Letters on July 26, 2007, H.R. 3189, 110th 
Cong. (2007), and Senator Russ Feingold introduced a companion bill in the Senate on Sept. 
25, 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 84. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2 (2006) (creating two Inspectors General within the Treasury 
Department); 5 U.S.C. app. 3. § 3(a) (Presidential appointment process); 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 11 
(identifying the twenty-nine agencies with presidentially appointed IGs). 
 85. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8G (identifying thirty agencies with department head-appointed 
IGs); 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8K (authorizing Director of National Intelligence to create an office of 
Inspector General); 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8G note (Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction) (indicating in subsection (c) that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, appoints the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction). 
 86. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3(a). 
 87. The heads of seven departments (Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, 
CIA, the Federal Reserve, and the U.S. Postal Service) can prevent their Inspector General 
from pursuing an investigation in order to protect an ongoing criminal investigation or 
national security, but must report to the congressional committees. FREDERICK M. KAISER & 
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL, at CRS-94 (2007), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf. 
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and report on the allegations.88 The President or department head 
who appointed the IG can also remove an IG without cause, but 
must inform Congress of the reasons for removal.89  
In 1988, when Congress created an Inspector General for the 
Justice Department, the Department successfully resisted 
congressional efforts to fold the Office of Professional Responsibility 
(OPR) into the Justice IG.90 Although members of Congress and the 
Justice Department IG himself have proposed placing OPR within 
the Office of Inspector General in order to give it more 
independence, the Executive Branch has repeatedly resisted these 
proposals.91  
Folding OPR into the Justice IG could go a long way toward 
improving accountability by ensuring that OPR is responsive to the 
legislative branch and making OPR processes more transparent. 
Currently, the head of OPR is appointed by the Attorney General 
and is subject to the Attorney General’s incentive awards. The Justice 
Department’s IG, on the other hand, is nominated by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate. Furthermore, while the head of OPR 
reports to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General, the 
IG reports both to Congress and the Attorney General. Finally, 
while OPR generally keeps its investigative reports secret, the IG 
regularly issues public reports on its investigations. 92 The Justice 
 
 88. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-177, § 119, 120 Stat. 192, 219 (2006). 
 89. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 3(b), 8G(e). President Reagan’s second act as President was his 
decision to remove all of the Inspectors General who had been appointed by President Carter. 
LIGHT, supra note 74, at 102. 
 90. LIGHT, supra note 74, at 129–30. 
 91. In 2007, for example, Representative John Conyers proposed an amendment to the 
Improving Government Accountability Act, H.R. 928, 110th Cong. (2007), which would 
have removed the requirement that the Department of Justice (DOJ) IG refer to OPR any 
investigations of DOJ lawyers. See Summary and Text of Amendments Submitted to the Rules 
Committee for H.R. 928, http://www.rules.house.gov/announcement_details.aspx?News 
ID=3052; Amendment 4 to H.R. 928, as Reported: Offered by Mr. Conyers of Michigan, 
available at http://www.rules.house.gov/110/amendments/hr928/110_hr928_conyers4. 
pdf. While the House of Representative adopted Conyers’ amendment, it was later dropped in 
Conference. See Bruce Moyer, Congress Declines to Give DOJ Watchdog More Teeth, FED. 
LAWYER, Oct. 2008, at 10; see also Strengthening the Unique Role of the Nation’s Inspectors 
General: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th 
Congress (July 11, 2007) (statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of 
Justice), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/testimony/ 0707/index.htm. 
 92. OPR does issue annual reports summarizing the kinds of cases it has investigated, 
but these reports provide few details about specific allegations and outcomes, and there are 
long delays in even this information being disclosed. As of January 2010, for example, the 
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Department’s IG, with its congressional mandate and independence 
from the Department leadership, has produced a more robust 
accountability regime than OPR. This contrast in the records of the 
Justice Department’s IG and OPR reveals the limits that may be 
inherent in a purely internal executive branch accountability 
mechanism. 
Inspectors General have sometimes succeeded in achieving 
accountability where other mechanisms have failed. For example, in 
the wake of the Justice Department’s arrest of more than 1200 aliens 
after September 11th, there was concern that these prisoners were 
languishing and being abused in jail, unable to contact family or 
lawyers.93 Despite requests by members of Congress and newspaper 
editorials, the government refused to reveal the names of these 
prisoners, the reasons they were being detained, or their location.94 
Several public interest organizations filed a Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) lawsuit in an attempt to force the government to reveal 
the identities of these prisoners, the dates of their arrests, and the 
nature of the charges against them, but the government convinced 
the D.C. Circuit that release of this information could help a 
terrorist group impede the government’s investigation of the 
September 11th attacks and thus was exempt from disclosure under 
FOIA.95 Nonetheless, the Justice Department’s Inspector General 
initiated an investigation into the detention and treatment of these 
prisoners, and ultimately issued a report criticizing several aspects of 
this mass detention.96 That report described just how broadly the 
September 11th investigative dragnet fell, and indicated that 
immigrants with no connection to terrorism were nonetheless 
 
most recent OPR Annual Report available was for fiscal year 2007 (a period ending on Sept. 
30, 2007). See OPR Annual Reports, http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/reports.htm (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2010). 
 93. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEPT. 11 DETAINEES 1–2 
(2003) [hereinafter DOJ IG, SEPT. 11 DETAINEES]. 
 94. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 96 (D.D.C. 
2002) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 95. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 931 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (FOIA exception 7 for law enforcement documents applies to the information 
requested). 
 96. While the DOJ IG report provided aggregate totals of the number of immigration 
detainees and their locations, it was not coextensive with the concerns expressed by the public 
interest groups, and in particular did not examine the treatment of prisoners who were held 
pursuant to material witness warrants rather than immigration violations. DOJ IG, SEPT. 11 
DETAINEES, supra note 93, at 4. 
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classified as “of interest to the September 11 investigation.”97 While 
the report did not provide all the information that the public interest 
organizations had requested in the FOIA suit, it did provide 
aggregate information on the number of prisoners, their countries of 
origin, and their dates of arrest.98  
 b. Ombudspersons. A second type of internal executive branch 
mechanism created by Congress is the ombudsperson, an official 
who receives and investigates complaints by individuals, businesses or 
others who have been aggrieved by an agency.99 Ideally, an 
ombudsperson is both independent (in that she is not subject to the 
control of the agency officials that she investigates) and is impartial 
(in that she does not have conflicts of interest).100 Ombudspersons 
partake of the first three stages of accountability: informing, 
justification, and evaluation. They have the authority to investigate 
and recommend action, and sometimes serve as a mediator between 
the agency and the complaining party. While ombudspersons can 
 
 97. Id. at 16. 
 98. Id. at 21–22. The report indicated that 491 were arrested in New York and seventy 
were arrested in New Jersey, but redacted the names of the eleven other states where 
individuals were arrested. Id. at 22; see also Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow 
“War”: FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1148–63 (2007). 
 99. The complaining party may be external, such as a small business complaining about 
agency regulations, or internal, such as an agency employee complaining about her treatment 
within the workplace. The Small Business Administration’s Office of the National Ombudsman 
“receives [complaints] from small business[es] . . . and acts as a liaison between them and 
federal agencies.” About the Office of the National Ombudsman, http://www.sba.gov/ 
aboutsba/sbaprograms/ombudsman/aboutus/OMBUD_ABOUTUS.html (last visited Jan. 
22, 2010). It was created by Congress and has the power “to receive, substantiate, and report 
to Congress complaints and comments from small business owners regarding regulatory 
enforcement actions taken against small businesses by federal agencies.” See U.S. Small 
Business Administration, Nicholas Owens, National Ombudsman, SBA Office of the National 
Ombudsman, http://www.sba.gov/tools/monthlywebchat/2007/CHAT_OWENS_BIO. 
html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HUMAN CAPITAL: THE 
ROLE OF OMBUDSMEN IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (2001) [hereinafter HUMAN CAPITAL] 
(identifying ten agencies that had ombudspersons addressing employee complaints). 
 100. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA) STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT 
AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS OFFICES 2 (2004), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/ 
webupload/commupload/AL322500/newsletterpubs/115.pdf (identifying independence, 
impartiality and confidentiality as “essential characteristics of [all] ombuds”). The ABA 
indicates that an ombudsperson is “independent” if no one who is “subject to the ombuds’s 
jurisdiction or anyone directly responsible for a person under the ombuds’s jurisdiction (a) can 
control or limit the ombuds’s performance of assigned duties or (b) can, for retaliatory 
purposes, (1) eliminate the office, (2) remove the ombuds, or (3) reduce the budget or 
resources of the office.” Id. at 3. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/12/2010 2:46 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
382 
recommend to the agency or to Congress specific reforms,101 they 
lack the power to impose their view or require the agency to 
respond.102  
In the federal government, members of Congress have long 
served an ombuds-like role when they provide constituent service.103 
In recent decades, Congress and the executive branch have created 
specific ombudsperson positions to take on this task in dozens of 
agencies.104 Some of these officials are called “ombudspersons,” but 
others serve this ombuds function while having a different title, such 
as the National Taxpayer Advocate,105 Office of Special Counsel, and 
Office of Government Information Services (OGIS).106  
Ombudspersons have two distinct functions relevant to executive 
branch accountability: assisting individuals or businesses that have 
been harmed by illegal government action and providing Congress 
with information about problems within the executive branch. The 
executive branch sometimes chafes at the efforts of ombudspersons 
and attempts to limit their independence or close them down. For 
example, in 2007, Congress passed legislation to establish the Office 
of Government Information Services (OGIS), which would serve as 
an ombudsperson to those making FOIA requests.107 Congress 
placed this office within the National Archives and mandated that it 
would “offer mediation services to resolve disputes between” FOIA 
 
 101. See, e.g., HUMAN CAPITAL, supra note 99, at 8 (“An ombudsman . . . brings to an 
entity’s attention chronic or systemic problems and makes recommendations for 
improvement.”). 
 102. MULGAN, supra note 46, at 91 (2003). 
 103. Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of 
Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1996) (“[C]ongressional casework covers much of the same 
terrain as might be handled through an ‘ombudsman’ system in other nations.”). 
 104. The website of the Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen lists thirty-four executive 
branch agencies (or subparts) with ombudspersons. See Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen, 
http://ombudsman.ed.gov/federalombuds/membership.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
 105. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) created the Office of Taxpayer Ombudsman in 
1979, and Congress codified the position in 1988, eventually changing its name to National 
Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) and expanding its authority to protect the interests of taxpayers and 
to report to Congress. See Evolution of the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate, http://www. 
irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/evolution_of_the_office_of_the_taxpayer_advocate.pdf (last visited Jan. 
14, 2010). Unlike most ombudspersons, the NTA can issue orders requiring its agency (the 
IRS) to take certain actions in the interests of taxpayers. Id.  
 106. 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)(1) (2009). 
 107. See generally Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act, 
Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007). 
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requesters and agencies as an alternative to litigation.108 While 
President Bush signed the bill that established this office, five weeks 
later he proposed abolishing the office and transferring its functions 
to the Department of Justice.109 Open government advocates decried 
this move, arguing that placing OGIS in the Department of Justice 
would destroy its independence because it would place the office 
within the department tasked with defending agencies sued by FOIA 
requesters.110 
Agency officials have sometimes resisted the efforts of 
ombudspersons, and in one case an agency eventually dissolved the 
ombuds office. Congress created the EPA’s National Ombudsman in 
1984 to deal with public complaints related to the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), but when statutory 
authority expired in 1989, EPA retained the office, and expanded its 
mandate to deal also with Superfund and other EPA programs.111 In 
January of 2001, the EPA issued new guidance for the National 
Ombudsman, clarifying that he could not play a role on issues that 
were the subject of litigation.112 The incumbent Ombudsman 
protested this limitation, as did several members of Congress.113 
Despite these protests, the EPA effectively diminished the office’s 
independence, transferring the incumbent Ombudsman to the Office 
of the Inspector General, an office that had allegedly interfered with 
earlier Ombudsman investigations.     
 
 108. 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)(1), (3) (2010). 
 109. Letter from Access Reports, Inc. et al. to Senators Robert C. Byrd & Thad Cochran 
(Feb. 6, 2008), in 154 CONG. REC. S1051 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2008). 
 110. See, e.g., Structure and Function of the Office of Government Information Services 
Established by the “Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act of 2007” 
(P.L. 110-175): Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census, & Nat’l Archives, 
110th Cong. (2008) (Testimony of Thomas Blanton, Executive Director, National Security 
Archive, George Washington Univ.), available at http://informationpolicy.oversight. 
house.gov/documents/20080919140008.pdf. 
 111. Draft Guidance for National Hazardous Waste Ombudsman and Regional 
Superfund Ombudsmen Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 365, 366 (Jan. 3, 2001). 
 112. See id. at 365–68. 
 113. See Office of the Ombudsman at the Environmental Protection Agency: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. On Environmental & Public Works, 107th Cong. 65–72 (June 25, 2002) 
(statement of Robert J. Martin, Former EPA National Ombudsman), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid= 
f:83699.pdf. 
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2. Congressionally created mechanisms within the executive branch that 
involve outside actors 
This section describes accountability mechanisms that are located 
within the Executive but also involve nonexecutive actors. These 
include information requests under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), protection of whistleblowing by executive branch 
employees, and specially created investigative commissions. 
 a. Freedom of Information Act. The Freedom of Information Act 
and its 1974 Amendments were a radical departure that set the stage 
for a new era of increased transparency in government. Under the 
Act, individuals and organizations can request government 
information for any reason.114 Requestors are not limited to seeking 
information about government wrongdoing, and most FOIA 
requests are entirely unrelated to allegations of government 
misconduct. Nonetheless, FOIA requests have been instrumental in 
revealing numerous government scandals,115 and the statute has 
enabled countless people and organizations to partake of the 
discovery stage of accountability. 
The process of seeking information can be cumbersome and may 
entail long delays. Where the request is initially denied, the requestor 
can administratively appeal116 and even file a lawsuit if the 
administrative appeal is unsuccessful. Some nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) such as the National Security Archive, Judicial 
Watch, and Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 
have utilized FOIA extensively.117 Unlike individuals, these 
 
 114. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); see also Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on GAO 
Access to Information on CIA Programs and Activities: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on Gov’t 
Efficiency, Financial Mgmt. & Intergovernmental Relations, and H. Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., 
Veterans Affairs, and Int’l Relations, H. Comm. on Governmental Reform, 107th Cong. (July 
18, 2001) (statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and 
Management), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_hr/071801_hinton.html 
(“Almost 90 percent of our staff days are in direct support of Congressional requestors, 
generally on the behalf of committee chairmen or ranking members.”). In 2002, Congress 
limited the ability of foreign governments to seek information under the statute. Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, sec. 312, § 552(a)(3), 116 Stat. 
2383, 2390–91 (2002). 
 115. See Kreimer, supra note 15, at 1056–59. 
 116. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006). 
 117. See, e.g., About the National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsar 
chiv/nsa/the_archive.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (“The Archive obtains its materials 
through a variety of methods, including the Freedom of Information act . . . . Archive staff 
members systematically track U.S. government agencies and federal records repositories for 
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organizations can take the long view in their investigations of 
government wrongdoing, sometimes receiving documents more than 
a decade after they initially requested them.118 These NGOs’ FOIA 
work can lead to further government investigations and legislative 
change. For example, a FOIA lawsuit brought by the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center resulted in the disclosure of abuses of 
Patriot Act authority, which then led to an investigation by the 
Justice Department’s Inspector General.119 
In the FOIA, Congress granted a general right to access 
government information, but it also limited that right by including 
in the statute broad exemptions.120 Two of those exemptions are 
particularly relevant to national security information: the (b)(1) 
exemption for information that is classified pursuant to executive 
order, and the (b)(3) exemption for information that is protected 
pursuant to statute.121 Several statutes instruct the executive branch 
to protect national security-related information, including the 
statutory protection for intelligence sources and methods, 
encryption, and atomic weapons information.122  
 b. Whistleblower protection. Whistleblowers serve as an 
accountability mechanism when they call attention to illegal 
executive branch actions. From Pentagon employee Ernest 
Fitzgerald’s 1969 testimony to Congress about billion dollar cost 
overruns,123 and chemist Frederic Whitehurst’s letters to the Justice 
 
documents that either have never been released before, or that help to shed light on the 
decision-making process of the U.S. government and provide the historical context underlying 
those decisions.”); Judicial Watch: About Us, http://www.judicialwatch.org/about-us (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2010) (“The motto of Judicial Watch is ‘Because no one is above the law.’ To 
this end, Judicial Watch uses the open records or freedom of information laws and other tools 
to investigate and uncover misconduct by government officials and litigation to hold to 
account politicians and public officials who engage in corrupt activities.”); About CREW, 
http://www.citizensforethics.org/about (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (“CREW employs the law 
as a tool to force officials to act ethically and lawfully and to bring unethical conduct to the 
public’s attention through: . . . Freedom of Information Act Requests . . . .”).  
 118. National Security Archive, 40 Years of FOIA, 20 Years of Delay: Oldest Pending 
FOIA Requests Date Back to the 1980s (2007), available at http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB224/ten_oldest_report.pdf. 
 119. Kreimer, supra note 15, at 1056–57. 
 120. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006). 
 121. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1), (3). 
 122. 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i) (intelligence sources and methods); 18 U.S.C. § 798 
(cryptographic information); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(y), 2162 (atomic weapons). 
 123. Myron Glazer, Ten Whistleblowers and How They Fared, 13 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 
33, 39 (1983). 
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Department’s Inspector General about junk science in the FBI crime 
lab during the 1990s,124 to Coleen Rowley’s memorandum to FBI 
Director Robert Mueller in 2002 about the investigation of Zacarias 
Moussaoui,125 whistleblowers’ willingness to come forward with 
information has been instrumental in triggering other accountability 
mechanisms. Whistleblowing involves two stages of accountability, 
but reverses their usual order. A whistleblower engages in evaluation 
when she determines that the government conduct is improper and 
in informing when she discloses the alleged misconduct. Executive 
branch whistleblowers may report illegal activity internally to an 
executive branch official or externally to Congress or the press. 
Congress has provided some protection for executive branch 
whistleblowers, but has excluded significant portions of the federal 
bureaucracy—those who engage in intelligence work—from its 
protection. 
Congress has recognized the importance of whistleblowers by 
enacting a series of legal protections for them. In 1912, Congress 
declared that the right of executive branch civil service employees to 
furnish information to Congress “shall not be denied or interfered 
with.”126 But this declared right did not provide any concrete 
protection for employees who reported wrongdoing to Congress. In 
1978, Congress provided a cause of action for certain executive 
branch employees who experienced retaliation for disclosing 
information about waste, fraud, and abuse.127 The 1978 legislation 
created a new executive branch agency, the Office of Special 
Counsel, which was tasked with the role of protecting 
whistleblowers.128 
 
 124. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE FBI LABORATORY: AN 
INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-
RELATED AND OTHER CASES (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/ 
special/9704a/. 
 125. Amanda Ripley & Maggie Sieger, The Special Agent, TIME, Dec. 30, 1992, at 34. 
 126. Lloyd-LaFollette Act, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912). 
 127. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, sec. 703(a)(2), 92 Stat. 
1111, 1216–17 (1979). Congress strengthened those protections in the Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, sec. 2(b), 103 Stat. 16 (1989). For a discussion 
of federal whistleblower protection, see LOUIS FISHER, NATIONAL SECURITY 
WHISTLEBLOWERS (2005); Thomas M. Devine, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: 
Foundation for the Modern Law of Employment Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531, 533–36 
(1999). 
 128. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 94-454, sec. 202, §§ 1204, 1206, 92 
Stat. 1111, 1112 (1979). 
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While Congress has made several efforts to encourage 
accountability through whistleblower protection, robust 
whistleblower protection has proven difficult to achieve. The first 
head of the Office of Special Counsel, a presidential nominee, 
actually worked to subvert the agency’s purpose, and trained 
governmental managers on how they could fire whistleblowers with 
impunity.129 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, the only court 
that hears whistleblower lawsuits, has repeatedly interpreted the 
whistleblower protection statute narrowly, excluding many 
whistleblowers from its protection.130 Employees who blow the 
whistle on illegal government action continue to suffer retaliation, 
including the loss of their jobs, security clearances and careers.131 
Even apart from these weaknesses in implementation of 
whistleblower protection, the statutes themselves exclude from their 
coverage executive branch employees who do intelligence-related 
work.132 In addition, the statutes explicitly exclude from protection 
the public disclosure of classified information.133 
 c. Special Commissions. In addition to FOIA and legislation 
prohibiting retaliation against whistleblowers, Congress has 
occasionally acted to heighten executive accountability by 
establishing ad hoc investigative commissions that include members 
chosen by the House or the Senate as well as by the President. These 
commissions can partake of all four stages of accountability: 
informing (when the commission gathers information), justification 
(when executive branch officials attempt to defend their conduct), 
evaluation (when the commission decides whether that conduct was 
proper), and—to a limited degree—rectification (if the commission 
states authoritatively that the government’s conduct was improper). 
Recognizing that Congress and the executive branch sometimes 
 
 129. Devine, supra note 127, at 544. 
 130. See COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 
ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2007, H.R. REP. NO. 110-42, pt. 1, at 4 (“This bill [the 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007] also responds to decisions by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the MSPB limiting the scope of disclosures 
covered under the federal whistleblower protection statute.”). 
 131. See James Sandler, The War on Whistleblowers, SALON, Nov. 1, 2007, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/11/01/whistleblowers/. 
 132. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2006). 
 133. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (excluding from protection the disclosure of information 
“specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or 
the conduct of foreign affairs”). 
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disagree about whether particular information should be classified, in 
2004 Congress passed legislation giving an advisory group, the 
Public Interest Declassification Board, responsibility to review the 
disputed material and make a recommendation to the President on 
whether particular information identified by a congressional 
committee should be classified.134 The Board consists of nine 
members, five appointed by the President and four chosen by 
congressional leaders.135 
At times, these specially appointed committees conduct 
investigations of past government conduct, and these investigations 
“are often the key factor in provoking the executive into itself 
undertaking rectification.”136 One example of this phenomenon is 
the Commission on the Japanese Internment, which, forty years after 
the fact, investigated the executive branch’s internment of over 
100,000 Japanese Americans during World War II. The internment 
was essentially approved by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. 
United States,137 but it is now seen as unnecessary, unjust, and based 
on the prejudices of certain military officials rather than on military 
necessity. President Ford officially withdrew the Executive Order 
that had established the internment policy;138 Congress passed 
legislation authorizing reparations, based in part on the work of the 
Commission;139 and courts overturned criminal convictions against 
three Japanese Americans who violated the internment orders.140 
When a purely internal executive branch investigation is deemed 
inadequate, Presidents may establish an ad hoc commission to 
 
 134. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, § 1102, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 435 note (2006) 
(Declassification of Information)). Congress had authorized the creation of the Public Interest 
Declassification Board in 2000, but its responsibilities were limited to making general policy 
recommendations on declassification efforts rather than reviewing specific disputed documents. 
See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-567, Title VII, 114 
Stat. 2831, 2856–64 (2000). 
 135. 50 U.S.C. § 435 note (2006) (Declassification of Information, sec. 703(c)). 
 136. MULGAN, supra note 46, at 47. 
 137. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 138. Proclamation No. 4417, 41 Fed. Reg. 35,7741 (Feb. 19, 1976).  
 139. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 904 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. app. 1989). 
 140. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 
1985). For a discussion of these cases, see ERIC YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL 
IZUMI, JERRY KANG & FRANK WU, RACE, RIGHTS & REPARATION: LAW & THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001). 
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investigate alleged wrongdoing. Presidents can create commissions 
unilaterally, as President Reagan did when he established the Rogers 
Commission to investigate the Challenger space shuttle disaster in 
1986141 and President Johnson did when he established the Warren 
Commission to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy.142 
On occasion (and sometimes over the objection of the President) 
Congress has established investigative commissions through statute, 
including the 9/11 Commission.143 Such commissions may or may 
not have subpoena power, and may be of short duration or limited 
staff. Their purpose tends to be both retrospective and prospective: 
finding facts about past wrongdoing and making recommendations 
about future government action.144 
IV.  A CASE STUDY IN ACCOUNTABILITY: THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY AGENCY’S WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 
One might expect that the multiplicity of the accountability 
mechanisms described above would hold the executive branch in 
check. But the executive branch has at times used claims of national 
security secrecy to avoid or defeat their effectiveness. This section 
examines the role these accountability mechanisms played in 
connection with the NSA’s warrantless domestic surveillance 
program, and the degree to which the Bush Administration’s claims 
of national security secrecy undermined those mechanisms.  
 
 141. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE 
CHALLENGER ACCIDENT (1986), available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/ 
genindex.htm. 
 142. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT 
KENNEDY (1964), available at http://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-
report/index.html. 
 143. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (known as 
the 9/11 Commission) was created by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 107-306, §§ 601–611, 116 Stat. 2383, 2408-13 (2002); NAT’L COMM’N ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004); see Mark 
Fenster, Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form, 65 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1239 (2008). 
 144. See KENNETH KITTS, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS & NATIONAL SECURITY: THE 
POLITICS OF DAMAGE CONTROL (2006); Lance Cole, Special National Investigative 
Commissions: Essential Powers and Procedures (Some Lessons from the Pearl Harbor, Warren 
Commission, and 9/11 Commission Investigations), 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009). 
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A. The NSA’s Warrantless Surveillance Program 
During the 1970s, Congress undertook extensive investigations 
of U.S. intelligence activities, spurred in part by Watergate, and 
discovered that intelligence agencies had engaged in warrantless 
surveillance of U.S. citizens based on their political beliefs and 
activities.145 In response, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act in 1978, and in doing so it clarified that within the 
United States, electronic surveillance is legal only if it is authorized 
by statute. There are two statutory regimes that specifically authorize 
and regulate electronic surveillance: Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control Act of 1968,146 which authorizes a warrant where there is 
probable cause to believe that the communication would reveal 
evidence of a crime; and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA),147 which authorizes a warrant where there is probable cause 
to believe that one of the parties is the agent of a foreign power or 
an international terrorist organization. To enforce this new regime, 
Congress included in FISA a criminal prohibition on any electronic 
surveillance not authorized by statute so that government officials 
who engage in surveillance without a warrant have committed a 
felony.148 Congress also provided a private cause of action to anyone 
subjected to such illegal surveillance.149 
The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does not reach 
individuals outside the country, and the two statutes discussed above 
(Title III and FISA) do not limit the government’s ability to conduct 
electronic surveillance of communications that take place entirely 
outside of the United States.150 The National Security Agency (NSA) 
does not need a warrant to monitor communications between two 
individuals if both are outside the United States.151 
 
 145. FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS 
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK II: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE 
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976) (The “Church Committee Report”). 
 146. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006). 
 147. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–71 (2006). 
 148. 50 U.S.C. § 1809. 
 149. 50 U.S.C. § 1810. 
 150. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (“Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall be deemed to 
affect the acquisition by the United States Government of foreign intelligence information 
from international or foreign communications . . . .”). 
 151. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO 
CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
INFORMATION, at CRS-17 (2006) (noting that FISA does not restrict the government’s ability 
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In October 2001, the Bush Administration expanded this 
surveillance to reach the content of telephone and e-mail 
communications where one party is inside the United States and 
another party to the communication is suspected of having a link to 
al Qaeda or a related terrorist organization.152 The traditional 
understanding is that because one of the parties is inside the United 
States, such surveillance requires a warrant, either under Title III or 
FISA.153 Nonetheless, the Bush Administration went forward with 
this surveillance without warrants, and without informing most 
members of the congressional intelligence committees. In addition, 
 
to engage in surveillance of communications outside the United States); JAMES BAMFORD, 
BODY OF SECRETS 441 (2002). 
 152. John Cary Sims, What NSA Is Doing . . . and Why It’s Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 105 (citing Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. 
Department of Justice, to F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, 
U.S. House of Representatives, Responses to Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, (Mar. 24, 
2006)); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY MAJORITY STAFF, REINING IN THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE 
W. BUSH 146 (2009) (the program began on or about Oct. 4, 2001). President Bush 
indicated that he authorized the program “[i]n the weeks following” September 11, 2001. 
President’s Radio Address (White House Radio broadcast Dec. 17, 2005), available at http:// 
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html. The exact 
parameters of this expanded surveillance have not been disclosed, and the surveillance has been 
described in varying ways. See, e.g., id. (asserting that one of the parties to the communication 
has “known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations”); see also Press Briefing by 
Att’y Gen. Alberto Gonzales and Gen. Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat’l 
Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Gonzales & Hayden Press Briefing], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html (statement 
of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales that “we have to have a reasonable basis to conclude that 
one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a 
member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda”). 
While it is not entirely clear what quantum of evidence constitutes a “reasonable basis,” it 
presumably is less than probable cause because if there were probable cause to believe that one 
of the parties were a member of al Qaeda, the government would be able to obtain a FISA 
warrant to monitor the communication. See Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of 
Warrantless Electronic Surveillance of Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the 
United States, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541, 544–45 (2008) (laying out additional formulations 
of the criteria used for surveillance); Sims, supra, at 126 (noting that a single phone call 
between a suspected terrorist in Pakistan and a person in the United States would not provide 
probable cause to believe that the person in the United States is an agent of a foreign power 
under FISA). 
 153. See, e.g., Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of 
Law, Duke University, et al., to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, et al. (Jan. 9, 2006), 
reprinted in N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006 [hereinafter Bradley Letter] (response of scholars 
of constitutional law and former government officials to “Justice Department’s December 22, 
2005 letter to the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees setting forth the administration’s defense of the [domestic spying] program”). 
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news reports indicate that AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth turned 
over to the NSA the companies’ records of their customers’ phone 
calls, enabling the NSA to use these records as part of a massive data-
mining operation.154 Such disclosure of customer calling records may 
violate federal and state privacy law.155 
Despite the multiple checks on executive branch illegality 
discussed in the previous section, this apparently illegal surveillance 
program continued from October 2001 until January 2007, when 
the government obtained orders from the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) for the targeting of “communications into 
or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe 
that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or 
an associated terrorist organization.”156 How, if at all, did the 
accountability mechanisms operate in connection to this program? 
While much remains secret, it is possible to sketch out some of the 
ways that these accountability mechanisms failed to control this 
program. This discussion is divided into two parts: how these 
mechanisms operated while the program remained secret, and then 
how they operated after the New York Times revealed the program in 
December of 2005. 
B. Executive, Congressional, and Judicial Checks while the 
Surveillance Program Remained Secret 
One of the checks on this surveillance program was its automatic 
sunset provision. The President initially authorized the program for 
about forty-five days and then renewed that authorization at the end 
of each forty-five-day period.157 This kind of automatic sunset 
constitutes an internal check on executive power in that it requires 
renewed attention to the program each time it expires. This sunset 
provision proved particularly important because it was tied to 
 
 154. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, 
May 11, 2006, at A1 (indicating that Qwest refused to turn over these customer records 
without a court order). 
 155. Id. (citing Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 222, 48 Stat. 1064 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006)). 
 156. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., to Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter 
(Jan. 17, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gonzales Letter], available at 
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag011707.pdf; see also ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, 
TERRORISM-RELATED CASES: SPECIAL CASE-MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES—CASE STUDIES 
124–25 (2008). 
 157. See President’s Radio Address, supra note 152.  
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another accountability mechanism: a requirement that the Attorney 
General certify the legality of the program each time that it was 
renewed. 
Before the surveillance program could proceed, the Attorney 
General had to certify its legality.158 Generally, the Attorney General 
defers to the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
regarding legal opinions, so it fell to OLC to analyze the legality of 
the surveillance program. At this time, Assistant Attorney General 
Jay Bybee and his Deputy, John Yoo, were in charge of OLC.159 The 
OLC surveillance opinion has not yet been made public in its 
entirety, but a 2009 Inspectors General report described and quoted 
from the opinion.160 Like the notorious 2002 torture memorandum 
described above,161 the surveillance opinion failed to mention 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,162 the leading Supreme Court 
decision setting out the limits on the President’s ability to act 
contrary to statute, even in the area of national security.163 It asserted 
that in enacting FISA, Congress did not purport to limit the 
President’s authority to engage in wartime surveillance, but failed to 
acknowledge that a provision of FISA explicitly applies during 
wartime.164 And the opinion was inaccurate in its factual description 
of intelligence activities.165 
In 2003, Jack Goldsmith replaced Jay Bybee as Assistant 
Attorney General and began to review the opinions issued by his 
predecessor. Goldsmith informed Attorney General John Ashcroft 
and Deputy Attorney General James Comey that he needed to 
withdraw the earlier opinion because of problems in its legal analysis, 
and they concurred. Because of the forty-five day sunset period and 
the requirement that the Attorney General sign off each time on the 
 
 158. Id. (indicating that the program had to be approved “by our nation’s top legal 
officials, including the Attorney General and the Counsel to the President”).  
 159. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, A16 (“John Yoo . . . worked on a classified legal opinion on the 
N.S.A.’s domestic eavesdropping program.”). 
 160. OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CIA, NSA & DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 11–13 (2009) [hereinafter UNCLASSIFIED IGS’ REPORT] (referring 
to a Nov. 2, 2001, opinion by John Yoo). 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 24–30. 
 162. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 163. UNCLASSIFIED IGS’ REPORT, supra note 160, at 13. 
 164. Id. at 12, 20. 
 165. Id. at 13, 22. 
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legality of the surveillance program, withdrawal of the earlier OLC 
opinion would have the effect of halting the program in its then-
current form.166 
The end of the forty-five day period occurred at a time when 
Attorney General Ashcroft was hospitalized and had transferred his 
responsibilities to Deputy Attorney General Comey, who became the 
Acting Attorney General. When the White House learned that the 
Justice Department was withdrawing its imprimatur for the 
surveillance program, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales went 
to Ashcroft’s hospital room, apparently to ask him to overrule 
Comey. In dramatic testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in 2007, Comey testified about the March 2004 
confrontation between Gonzales and the Justice Department lawyers 
in Ashcroft’s hospital room.167 Ashcroft refused to re-approve the 
program, and the Bush Administration reauthorized the program 
without the Attorney General’s certification.168 In response, Comey 
and other high level Justice Department officials, including FBI 
director Robert Mueller, prepared to resign.169 President Bush’s 
Chief-of-Staff Andrew Card expressed concern “that there were to 
be a large number of resignations at the Department of Justice.”170 
Later, Comey and Mueller each met privately with President Bush, 
and after those meetings, the President indicated that the program 
would be modified so that it could receive the Justice Department’s 
approval.171 
While the executive branch is statutorily required to “keep the 
[full] congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 
informed of all intelligence activities,”172 the Bush Administration 
informed only the chair and ranking members of those committees, 
 
 166. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the 
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?—Part IV: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th 
Cong. 213–40 (2007) (statement of James Comey, Former Deputy Attorney General, United 
States Dep’t of Justice). 
 167. Id. at 213–15. 
 168. Id. at 215, 219. 
 169. Id. at 219. Comey later explained that “I couldn’t stay, if the administration was 
going to engage in conduct that the Department of Justice had said had no legal basis.” Id. 
 170. Id. at 218. 
 171. Id. at 223–24; see also UNCLASSIFIED IGS’ REPORT, supra note 160, at 27–30. 
 172. 50 U.S.C. § 413a(1) (2006). This obligation extends only “[t]o the extent 
consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally 
sensitive matters.” 50 U.S.C. § 413a. 
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along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate 
about the program.173 The Bush Administration used a claim of 
national security secrecy to prevent even this smaller group of 
legislators from effectively exercising any oversight regarding the 
program by insisting that they not discuss this issue with other 
members of the intelligence committees or even their staffs.174 The 
powerlessness of these legislators is illustrated by the handwritten 
note that Senator Jay Rockefeller sent to Vice President Cheney, 
noting that Rockefeller is “neither a technician nor an attorney,” and 
decrying his “inability to consult staff or counsel” in order to 
evaluate the legality of the program.175 
The Justice Department informed the Chief Judge of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) about the program, 
and that judge expressed concern about the program’s possible 
illegality.176 The judge did not believe that she had the power to rule 
on the legality of the program, but did insist that the government 
not use any information derived from the program in its warrant 
applications with the FISC.177 When a senior Justice Department 
lawyer discovered that such information had been used in FISA 
warrant applications and informed the FISC Chief Judge, the judge 
complained to the Attorney General and insisted “that high-level 
Justice officials certify the [warrant application] information was 
complete” in order to prevent future lapses.178 The Justice 
 
 173. This is the group of legislators (sometimes referred to as “the gang of eight”) to 
whom the executive branch must disclose covert actions, 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(2) (2006), and 
the Bush Administration may have claimed that the surveillance program was a covert action, 
thus allowing for narrower disclosure. But covert actions are defined by statute as activities to 
secretly “influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad . . . .” 50 U.S.C. § 
413b(e). Furthermore, the statute excludes from the definition of covert action any “activities 
the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence . . . .” 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e)(1). 
 174. ALFRED CUMMING, “GANG OF FOUR” CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
NOTIFICATIONS 6 (2009). 
 175. Letter from Senator Jay Rockefeller to Vice President Cheney (July 17, 2003) (on 
file with author), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2005/ 
intell-051219-rockefeller01.pdf; see also Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in 
Intelligence Oversight (forthcoming 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Congress’s Right to 
Counsel]. 
 176. Carol D. Leonnig, Secret Court’s Judges Were Warned About NSA Spy Data, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 9, 2006, at A01. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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Department temporarily suspended part of the program and 
instituted tighter controls.179 
Another accountability mechanism, whistleblowing, was also at 
play in connection with warrantless surveillance. Thomas Tamm, a 
career Justice Department lawyer who worked in the Office of 
Intelligence Policy and Review (which processes FISA warrant 
applications and files them with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court), learned of the existence of the warrantless surveillance 
program and was concerned about its possible illegality. But he was 
stymied when he sought additional information about it from his 
supervisors and when he attempted to inform a congressional staff 
member about it. In the spring of 2004, he went to a payphone in a 
Washington subway station and called New York Times reporter, Eric 
Lichtblau, who co-authored the article that broke the story a year 
and a half later.180 Tamm’s information about the program was quite 
limited, but his “cold call”181 on Lichtblau and their subsequent 
conversations prompted Lichtblau and his colleague, James Risen, to 
obtain additional information from other sources, eventually 
resulting in public disclosure of the program, congressional hearings, 
statutory reforms, and civil lawsuits over the program. 
C. Congressional, Judicial, Executive and Public Responses to the 
Disclosure of the Program 
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times published an 
article revealing the NSA domestic surveillance program.182 The 
Times had held off from publishing the story for more than a year, 
apparently at the request of Bush Administration officials who 
claimed the publication would harm national security.183 The Times’ 
decision to go ahead with publication was apparently motivated by 
its desire not to be scooped on the story by its own reporter’s 
publication of his book covering the issue.184 So competition among 
 
 179. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 159, at A1. 
 180. Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008. 
 181. Id. After the New York Times disclosure, the Justice Department instituted a 
criminal investigation into the leak of this information, eventually focusing on Tamm. 
 182. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 159. 
 183. Id. Due to the Administration’s security concerns, Risen and Lichtblau also omitted 
“[s]ome information that administration officials argued could be useful to terrorists . . . .” Id. 
 184. Gabriel Sherman, Risen Gave Times A Non-Disclosure on Wiretap Book, N.Y. 
OBSERVER, Jan. 22, 2006, http://www.observer.com/node/38277 (noting that Times 
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publications was instrumental in ensuring that this program came to 
light. 
The following day, President Bush acknowledged the existence 
of the surveillance program in his weekly radio address,185 and a few 
days later Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and the Principal 
Deputy Director of National Intelligence, General Michael Hayden, 
convened a press conference to discuss the legal justification for the 
program.186 One of the judges on the FISC resigned in protest,187 
and the Chief Judge arranged for a secret briefing in which the other 
FISC judges would have an opportunity to question Justice 
Department officials about the legality of the program.188 Within one 
week of the disclosure, the Justice Department released a five-page 
letter to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Intelligence 
Committees defending the program’s legality,189 and a month later, 
the Justice Department issued a forty-two-page white paper with 
more detailed legal arguments.190 Legal scholars and NGOs 
responded with their own critiques of the white paper.191 
The Times article indicated that “[n]early a dozen current and 
former officials” discussed the program with the reporters “because 
 
executive editor Bill Keller denied that Risen’s book was a factor in the timing of the NSA 
story, but other sources said that Times editors pressed to publish the story prior to the book’s 
publication). 
 185. President’s Radio Address, supra note 152. 
 186. Gonzales & Hayden Press Briefing, supra note 152. Before becoming Principle 
Deputy Director of National Intelligence in April 2005, General Hayden had served since 
March 1999 as Director of the NSA, during which period the surveillance program was 
developed and implemented. See Biography of Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, 
http://www.nsa.gov/about/leadership/bio_hayden.shtml (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
 187. Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, Spy Court Judge Quits In Protest; Jurist 
Concerned Bush Order Tainted Work of Secret Panel, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A01. 
 188. Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, Judges on Surveillance Court to Be Briefed on Spy 
Program, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2005, at A01; Eric Lichtblau, Judges and Justice Dept. Meet 
Over Eavesdropping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at A14. 
 189. Letter from Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to Leadership 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence (Dec. 22, 2005), in David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The National Security 
Agency’s Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355, 1360–63 (2006). 
 190. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE 
PRESIDENT (2006), reprinted in Cole & Lederman, supra note 189, at 1374–1414. 
 191. See, e.g., Bradley Letter, supra note 153; Letter from Scholars and Former 
Government Officials to Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice Department 
Whitepaper of January 19, 2006 (Feb. 2, 2006), reprinted in Cole & Lederman, supra note 
189, at 1415–25. 
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of their concerns about the operation’s legality and oversight.”192 In 
response, the Justice Department began a criminal investigation to 
find out the identity of those who leaked the information.193 
Several congressional committees initiated investigations of the 
program, requiring administration officials to answer questions about 
the program’s legality.194 Nonetheless, Congress eventually passed 
legislation that specifically authorizes warrantless surveillance, and 
immunizes telecommunications companies that participated, 
effectively ratifying the Bush Administration’s surveillance program. 
While the Bush Administration claimed that it already had statutory 
authority for the program (under the September, 2001 
Authorization of Use of Military Force), Congress passed a 
temporary revision to FISA in August 2007, that authorized the 
government to engage in warrantless surveillance directed at people 
outside the United States, even if they are communicating with 
persons within the United States.195 This provision lapsed in 
February 2008, and later that year Congress passed FISA 
Amendments that again authorized warrantless surveillance, 
purported to immunize telecommunications companies from private 
lawsuits based on their cooperation with warrantless surveillance, and 
prohibited state governments from investigating those companies for 
such cooperation.196 
Private plaintiffs filed lawsuits against the government and 
against the telecommunications companies that apparently 
cooperated with the government’s surveillance.197 Five of these 
lawsuits were against a federal government agency or government 
 
 192. Risen & Lichtblau, supra, note 159, at A1.  
 193. Michael Isikoff, Looking for a Leaker, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 2007, at 8 (describing 
FBI raid on the home of a former Justice Department lawyer who had concerns about the 
legality of the surveillance). 
 194. See, e.g., David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 2 n.4 
(Brookings Institution, Series on Counterterrorism and American Statutory Law Working 
Paper, Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/ 
2007/1115_nationalsecurity_kris/1115_nationalsecurity_kris.pdf (identifying congressional 
hearings following revelation of the surveillance program). 
 195. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552; see Avery, supra 
note 152, at 585–86. 
 196. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436. 
 197. For an excellent in-depth discussion of these lawsuits, see REAGAN, supra note 156, 
at 124–59. 
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official.198 Dozens of lawsuits were filed against AT&T, Verizon, and 
MCI, telecommunications companies that allegedly worked with the 
NSA in intercepting these communications.199 In addition, the 
Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont state public utility commissions, 
two individual commissioners in Missouri, and the New Jersey 
Attorney General attempted to investigate these companies, seeking 
information about whether the companies violated state privacy laws 
in assisting the NSA.200 The federal government sued these state 
entities and officials to prevent them from investigating the 
program.201  
A difficulty facing the private plaintiffs in these suits is proving 
that they actually were subjected to surveillance. While the 
government has confirmed the existence of the program, it has not 
provided specifics of who was targeted for surveillance, so the 
plaintiffs have had difficulty proving that they have standing. Some 
of the plaintiffs simply allege that they make international calls, and 
thus believe that they are subject to surveillance.202 Other plaintiffs, 
such as the Center for Constitutional Rights lawyers representing 
Guantanamo prisoners who have communicated with those 
prisoners’ family and friends abroad, seem to have a stronger claim 
that they were likely subject to this surveillance.203  
In all of the NSA cases involving private plaintiffs, the 
government filed motions to dismiss based on the state secrets 
 
 198. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. 
Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007); Complaint, Shubert v Bush, No. M:06-cv-01791 (N.D. 
Cal. May 11, 2007) (filed in Brooklyn, but transferred to N.D. Cal.); Complaint, Ctr. for 
Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-cv-313 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (filed in Manhattan but 
transferred to N.D. Cal.); Guzzi v. Bush, No. 1:06-cv-0136 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2006) (filed in 
Atlanta, but transferred to N.D. Cal.); see also REAGAN, supra note 156, at 131–32. 
 199. REAGAN, supra note 156, at 125. A federal judicial center report indicated that “[a]t 
least 45 suits” have stemmed from the NSA domestic surveillance program revealed by the 
New York Times and the data-mining program revealed by USA Today. Id. at 124–25, 132. 
 200. See AT&T Mich.’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, In re ACLU of Mich. v. AT&T Mich., 
No. U-15204 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Mar. 2, 2007), available at http://efile. 
mpsc.cis.state.mi.us (enter case # 15204; then follow “0016” hyperlink). 
 201. REAGAN, supra note 156, at 140 (identifying the five states as Connecticut, Maine, 
Missouri, New Jersey, and Vermont). 
 202. ACLU, 493 F.3d at 664; Amended Compl., Shubert v. Bush, No. M:06-cv-01791-
VRW at 2–4 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2007), available at http://www. 
eff.org/files/filenode/att/ShubertAmendedComplaint.pdf. 
 203. Complaint, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. M:06-cv-01791-VRW 
(N.D. Cal. July 21, 2007). This suit, like almost all other lawsuits, was transferred to the 
Northern District of California; see also REAGAN, supra note 156, at 129. 
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privilege.204 Until recently, the government invoked the state secrets 
privilege to prevent a private party in civil litigation from accessing or 
putting into evidence specific items of information that the 
government asserted must be kept secret for national security or 
foreign policy reasons. In these NSA cases, the government invoked 
the state secrets privilege to dismiss the cases in their entirety, 
asserting either that the plaintiffs could not prove standing or that 
the defense could not prove its case without accessing information 
subject to the privilege. While this broad use of the state secrets 
privilege is not unprecedented, it is occurring on a larger scale than 
in the past. In the first case to reach a federal appellate court, ACLU 
v. NSA, the Sixth Circuit ruled for the government on standing 
grounds, finding that the plaintiffs could not prove that they had 
been subject to the surveillance, and could not get discovery because 
of the secrets privilege.205  
One group of plaintiffs seems to have strong evidence that it was 
subject to surveillance—that connected with the al-Haramain 
Foundation, an Oregon charity. In 2004, the Treasury Department 
froze the Foundation’s assets because of its alleged ties to al 
Qaeda.206 Al-Haramain contested the government’s allegations, and 
as part of that proceeding, the government turned over to al-
Haramain’s lawyer discovery material that documented private phone 
conversations between one of the Foundation’s officers in Saudi 
Arabia and two of its U.S.-based lawyers.207 The government later 
asserted that it had provided this document in error, and retrieved it 
from al-Haramain’s lawyers, but did not retrieve the copies in the 
hands of al-Haramain itself.208 After the New York Times disclosed 
the NSA program in December of 2005, al-Haramain concluded 
that this document indicated that it had been subject to the NSA’s 
 
 204. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007); 
ACLU, 493 F.3d at 650; Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (N.D. Cal. 
2006); see also REAGAN, supra note 156 at 126 n.1091 (listing state secrets-based motions to 
dismiss in additional cases). 
 205. 493 F.3d at 683, 687–88. 
 206. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D. Or. 
2006), rev’d, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 207. Patrick Raddan Keefe, State Secrets: A Government Misstep in a Wiretapping Case, 
NEW YORKER, Apr. 28, 2008, at 28, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/ 
2008/04/28/080428fa_fact_keefe; see also REAGAN, supra note 156, at 130 n.1117. Plaintiffs 
described this document as a log of clandestinely monitored telephone calls between the 
charity’s director in Saudi Arabia and its lawyers in Washington, D.C. Id. 
 208. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.  
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warrantless surveillance, and filed suit in Oregon District Court, 
providing the court with a copy of the document in a sealed filing.209  
The Oregon District Court denied the government’s motion to 
dismiss based on state secrets grounds, and allowed the plaintiffs to 
rely on their memories of the sealed document for evidence that they 
were subject to surveillance.210 The government appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit, which reversed the District Court’s decision to allow 
the plaintiffs to recreate from memory the sealed document, but 
nonetheless remanded the case on the issue of whether FISA 
preempts the state secrets privilege.211 While the al-Haramain case 
was pending in the Ninth Circuit, all of the NSA-related lawsuits 
(except ACLU v. NSA) were transferred to the Northern District of 
California as part of the multi-district litigation protocol,212 so the al-
Haramain case was remanded to Judge Vaughn Walker in San 
Francisco. In 2008, Judge Walker ruled that under certain 
conditions, FISA partially preempts the state secrets privilege.213  
The FISA statute provides a civil cause of action to some who 
have been subject to warrantless surveillance,214 and includes 
procedures allowing discovery that is not available under the state 
secrets privilege.215 Judge Walker ruled that where these procedures 
apply, they preempt the state secrets doctrine, but in order to benefit 
from that preemption, plaintiffs must first show they have been 
subjected to electronic surveillance.216 In making this preliminary 
showing, plaintiffs are subject to the state secrets privilege.217 Once 
they make this showing, the court will then turn to the issue of 
whether the surveillance was legal, and in making that legality 
determination, the state secrets privilege does not apply.218 Instead 
 
 209. Id. at 1218.  
 210. Id. at 1227, 1229. 
 211. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 212. Bob Egelko, Surveillance Lawsuits Transferred to Judge Skeptical of Bush Plan, S.F. 
CHRON., Aug. 11, 2006, at B1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/08/11/BAGRGKGL4S1.DTL. 
 213. In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
 214. 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2008) (providing a cause of action to those whose 
communications were intentionally subject to warrantless electronic surveillance as long as that 
person is not “a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”). 
 215. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2008). 
 216. In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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the court will use the procedures set forth in FISA.219 Those 
procedures allow the court to examine documents in camera and 
even to disclose materials to the plaintiffs “under appropriate security 
procedures and protective orders” if “such disclosure is necessary to 
make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance.”220 
The state secrets privilege prevents al-Haramain from relying on the 
accidentally revealed document to show that it had been subject to 
surveillance, and so Judge Walker dismissed al-Haramain’s case 
without prejudice, allowing it to re-file if it has non-privileged 
evidence showing that it was subject to electronic surveillance.221 
In early 2006, more than forty members of Congress requested 
that the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility 
(OPR) open an investigation into whether the department lawyers 
acted properly in approving the surveillance program.222 In response, 
OPR opened an investigation and planned to interview Justice 
Department lawyers who had been involved in the approval process. 
The Bush Administration considered all of this information to be 
classified, and so in order to pursue the investigation, OPR officials 
would need security clearances. Such clearances had been granted to 
Civil Division lawyers defending the program in court and to 
Criminal Division lawyers investigating the leak to the New York 
Times.223 H. Marshall Jarrett, then the head of OPR, requested that 
he and six OPR employees be given security clearances so that they 
could begin the investigation, but apparently on the advice of then 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, President Bush denied the 
clearances, blocking the OPR investigation.224 This was the first time 
in its history that OPR shut down an investigation because it was 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. See 18 U.S.C. § 1806(f). 
 221. In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. 
 222. Memorandum for the Attorney General Through Paul J. McNulty from H. Marshall 
Jarrett Re: Status of OPR Investigation (Apr. 21, 2006); Letter from Maurice Hinchey, Henry 
Waxman, John Lewis and Lynn Woolsey to George W. Bush (July 18, 2006) (on file with 
author), available at http://www.house.gov/hinchey/newsroom/press_2006/071806nsalet 
tertobush.html [hereinafter Hinchey Letter]. 
 223. Jason Ryan, White House Blocked Spy Program Probe, ABC NEWS, July 18, 2006, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=2208888&page=1. 
 224. Murray Waas, Aborted DOJ Probe Probably Would Have Targeted Gonzales, NAT’L 
J., Mar. 15, 2007, http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/0315nj1.htm; Ryan, supra note 
223. 
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denied security clearances.225 Jarrett notified the members of 
Congress who had requested the probe, and they responded by 
writing the President and requesting that the clearances be 
granted.226 More than a year later, when Michael Mukasey replaced 
Gonzales as Attorney General, the Bush Administration granted 
OPR the clearances, and the investigation began.227 
In January 2007, the Bush Administration apparently modified 
the surveillance program and brought it under the supervision of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).228 While the Bush 
Administration officials initially described the program as broad 
enough to target communications where there is “a reasonable basis 
to conclude that one party to the communication is . . . a member of 
an organization affiliated with al Qaeda,”229 this new iteration of the 
program called for targeting “communications into or out of the 
United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of 
the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated 
terrorist organization.”230 This decision constitutes partial 
rectification by ceasing the most controversial aspect of the program: 
the lack of any judicial supervision. The decision to bring the 
program under court supervision may have been caused by pressure 
from the cooperating telecommunications companies or by the 
prospect of a less friendly 110th Congress controlled by the 
Democratic Party. 
The Bush Administration’s surveillance program appears to have 
violated FISA, and an intentional violation of FISA is a felony.231 
Thus, those who authorized the program may have committed a 
felony. A few Democratic members of Congress proposed 
impeaching President Bush for FISA violations, but there was little 
political support for such a move. Calls for impeachment came from 
those outside of the mainstream of the Democratic Party such as 
Cynthia McKinney, who introduced an impeachment bill at the very 
 
 225. Shane Harris & Murray Waas, Justice Department Probe Foiled, NAT’L L.J., May 25, 
2006, http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/0525nj2.htm. 
 226. Waas, supra note 224; Hinchey Letter, supra note 222. 
 227. Terry Frieden, Justice Department to Re-open No-warrant Wiretap Probe, CNN 
(Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/13/domestic.spying/ 
index.html. 
 228. Gonzales Letter, supra note 156; REAGAN, supra note 156. 
 229. Gonzales & Hayden Press Briefing, supra note 152 (emphasis added). 
 230. Gonzales Letter, supra note 156. 
 231. 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2008) (prescribing up to five years imprisonment). 
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end of the 109th Congress, after she had lost reelection, and Dennis 
Kucinich.232 More powerful members of Congress, such as Judiciary 
Committee Chair John Conyers, refused to move forward with 
impeachment proceedings.233 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CLAIMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY 
This Article has outlined the multiple mechanisms that can help 
ensure that the executive branch complies with the law, and hold the 
executive branch accountable when it violates that law. At first 
glance, it would appear that this complicated network of multiple 
overlapping accountability mechanisms would provide a plethora of 
protections and ensure a robust system of accountability. But all of 
these accountability mechanisms have one factor in common: their 
dependence on information. If the mechanism does not or cannot 
obtain information about a particular program, it cannot ensure legal 
accountability for that program. Remove the information, and the 
entire structure of apparently robust accountability collapses. 
By reviewing the complex narrative of the Bush Administration’s 
warrantless surveillance program and how accountability mechanisms 
responded to it, one can see how this central weakness—vulnerability 
to claims of national security secrecy—played out. The Bush 
Administration systematically used national security secrecy to 
prevent multiple accountability mechanisms from scrutinizing its 
warrantless surveillance program. The case study reveals what is 
essentially a design flaw in our system of accountability: the executive 
branch’s ability to avoid accountability through claims of national 
security secrecy. This leads to the next question: How can one cure 
this design flaw? 
While this Article does not purport to provide a complete answer 
to that question, its analysis does suggest that in evaluating both the 
need for and efficacy of any particular accountability mechanism, one 
must consider that mechanism’s context, and look at how it 
functions within the entire architecture of accountability. Where all 
of the relevant accountability mechanisms share the same weakness—
 
 232. H.R. Res. 1106, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006); H.R. Res. 1258, 110th Cong. 
(2008). Kucinich’s proposal had only eleven cosponsors. See Cosponsors of H.R. 1258, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HE01258:@@@P. 
 233. See, e.g., Molly K. Hooper, Kucinich May Get Hearing on Impeachment Resolution, 
CQ POLITICS, July 14, 2008, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-
000002916681. 
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the executive branch’s ability to opt out of accountability by claiming 
national security secrecy—there may be a particularly urgent need for 
reform. Congress needs to consider reforms that would limit the 
executive branch’s ability to opt out of accountability. One 
possibility would be to require more robust disclosure to Congress. I 
have explored elsewhere several options for increasing disclosure to 
Congress.234 Here I want to sketch out another possible reform: 
limiting the executive branch’s ability to claim the state secrets 
privilege to avoid judicial scrutiny of allegedly illegal conduct. 
Limiting the state secrets privilege could be accomplished in one 
of several ways. The Bush Administration succeeded in using the 
state secrets privilege to block dozens of lawsuits arising out of its 
controversial programs of domestic surveillance and rendition, and 
the Obama Administration is continuing this practice.235 In 
persuading courts to dismiss these lawsuits, the executive branch 
prevents courts from serving as an accountability mechanism that 
could independently examine and evaluate the legality of these 
programs. There are already legislative proposals that would limit the 
ability of the executive branch to obtain dismissals of lawsuits based 
on state secrets grounds, requiring that courts consider in camera 
that information that the executive branch claims is privileged.236 
Alternatively, one could limit the government’s ability to assert the 
state secrets privilege in response to allegations of government 
wrongdoing. 
Courts recognize and give effect to an evidentiary privilege, such 
as the attorney-client privilege, in order to protect and promote a 
particular goal, such as facilitating the administration of justice by 
ensuring that individuals and entities can get legal advice in 
confidence. Similarly, courts have recognized the state secrets 
 
 234. See Kathleen Clark, “A New Era of Openness?:” Disclosing Intelligence to Congress 
under Obama, 26 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2010); Congress’s Right to Counsel, supra 
note 175. 
 235. In a lawsuit filed by someone allegedly subjected to extraordinary rendition, the 
Obama Administration argued that the case should be dismissed under the state secrets 
privilege, and successfully sought rehearing en banc of a Ninth Circuit panel decision that had 
reversed dismissal of the case. Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 
2009) (ordering rehearing en banc); Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing en banc, Mohamed 
v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., No. 08-15693 (9th Cir. 2009), available at http://www.aclunc. 
org/cases/active_cases/asset_upload_file741_8488.pdf. 
 236. See State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong.; State Secrets 
Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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privilege to protect information the disclosure of which could harm 
the nation’s security. But courts also recognize that privileges have 
their limits, and at times the goal or interest that is furthered by a 
privilege must give way to a competing goal. So when the Supreme 
Court recognized the presidential communications privilege in 
United States v. Nixon in order to ensure that presidents could 
receive candid advice, the court also acknowledged that this interest 
in candor and confidentiality is superseded when the information is 
relevant to a criminal trial.237 And while courts have recognized that 
governments, like private parties, can assert the attorney-client 
privilege to prevent the disclosure of information related to legal 
advice, the government’s ability to assert that privilege must give way 
in the face of a criminal investigation.238 
These wrongdoing-based exceptions show that even worthy 
privileges sometimes must give way to the competing public interest 
in the disclosure of government wrongdoing, and this analysis may 
be just as applicable to the state secrets privilege as it is to the 
presidential communications and attorney-client privileges.239 
Recognizing a crime- or fraud-based exception to the state secrets 
privilege may be necessary to prevent the executive branch from 
doing an end run around judicial accountability for violations of law.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article is a first attempt to outline some of the myriad 
mechanisms that hold the executive branch and its officials 
accountable for violations of the law. This cataloging of 
accountability mechanisms reveals a distributed architecture of 
accountability, with mechanisms of varying independence and 
 
 237. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706–07 (1974). 
 238. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(attorney-client privilege inapplicable because government lawyers have duty to act in the 
public interest); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (duty of officers of executive 
branch to uphold the public trust militates against allowing invocation of attorney-client 
privilege to prevent disclosure of criminal offenses within the government); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997) (attorney-client privilege held 
inapplicable to government attorneys, who have a duty to report criminal wrongdoing). But see 
In re United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005) (attorney-client privilege encourages 
government officials to seek out and receive fully informed legal advice). 
 239. See also Exec. Order No. 12958, as amended by Exec. Order 13292 § 1.7, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 15315, 15318 (Mar. 28, 2003) (prohibiting classification for the purpose of hiding 
information about illegality). 
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efficacy inside and outside the executive branch. In some situations, 
one mechanism interferes with the operation of another, as when a 
congressional committee’s provision of witness immunity results in 
overturning of a criminal conviction of a wrongdoer.240 But in other 
situations, these diverse mechanisms actually build on each other, as 
when a whistleblower’s revelation to a journalist results in news 
story, which then prompts congressional, inspector general, and 
sometimes even criminal investigations.241 So any attempt to assess 
the efficacy of an individual accountability mechanism must consider 
how it builds on and contributes to the work of other accountability 
mechanisms.  
The Article also analyzed in detail how these accountability 
mechanisms operated—or failed to operate—in connection with the 
Bush Administration’s warrantless surveillance program. The 
executive branch has largely been able to avoid the scrutiny of these 
multiple accountability mechanisms by asserting national security 
secrecy. This case study reveals a design flaw in our system of 
accountability: the executive branch’s ability to avoid accountability 
through claims of national security secrecy. The secrecy surrounding 
the surveillance program apparently undermined the ability of 
existing accountability mechanisms to operate, from congressional 
committee oversight, to Inspector General investigations, to civil 
lawsuits. There has not yet been a thorough, transparent, and 
independent evaluation of that controversial surveillance program. 
And that deficiency will remain the case until we see reform limiting 
the executive branch’s ability to assert national security secrecy in the 
face of credible allegations of wrongdoing.  
 
 
 240. See, e.g., Poindexter v. United States, 951 F.2d 369, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 241. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 15, at 1056–57 (describing the role of FOIA requests 
in prompting Inspector General investigations of the military’s mistreatment of prisoners and 
the FBI’s abuse of Patriot Act authority); Cynthia M. Nolan, Seymour Hersh’s Impact on the 
CIA, 12 INT’L J. INTEL. & COUNTERINTEL. 18 (1999) (the results of the CIA’s internal 
investigation were leaked to journalist Seymour Hersh, who wrote a series of stories in the New 
York Times, leading to congressional investigations of intelligence abuses).  
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APPENDIX: EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS PROSECUTED FOR 




















After World War II, Meyer was 
implicated in possible war 
profiteering and fraud, because 
he had procured parts for the 
Army from his own company. 
In order to escape responsibility 
for his corrupt practices, Meyers 
told Bleriot H. Lamarre, the 
president of Aviation Electric 
Corporation, which Meyers 
owned, to lie to Congress about 
Meyer’s ownership of the 
company and two different gifts 
from the company to Meyers. 














of State) iii 
Denied to the HUAC that he 
was a communist or had spied 
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Made false statements to Senate 
committee at hearing on his 
confirmation as Attorney 
General regarding White House 
interference in the Justice 
Department’s antitrust litigation 
against International Telephone 
and Telegraph.viii  







to one month 
imprisonment, $100 













Made false statements to Senate 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities 
regarding his approval of the 
funding for the Watergate 
break-in, as well as his later 





Congress under 18 
U.S.C. § 1621 and 
other related crimes; 
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Made false statements to Senate 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities 
regarding his and Nixon’s 
contemporaneous knowledge of 
the Watergate cover-up. 
Convicted of three 
counts of false 
statements before 
Congress, and two 
related counts; 













Misrepresented the CIA’s covert 
involvement in Chile, which 
included attempts to influence 
the 1970 presidential election 
and assassination and coup 
attempts, contrary to the 
policies of the U.S. 
Government. 
Pled guilty to two 
misdemeanor 
counts under  
2 U.S.C. § 192 
(refusal to testify); 
sentenced to two 










Testified falsely in a sworn 
statement submitted to a 
congressional subcommittee 
and repeated the falsehood 
under oath that she had recused 
herself from involvement in an 
investigation of a former 
employer.xviii 
Convicted of 




Congress, and two 
counts of perjury; 
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Initially denied and then gave 
partially false information about 
his role as organizer of the 
Iran/contra scheme; helped 
others, including his 
subordinate North, cover up the 
scandal and lied about doing so; 
kept certain parts of the affair 
secret from Congress.  
Pled guilty to four 
misdemeanor 




























Helped to “draft a false 
chronology of the Iran arms 
sales and altered and destroyed 
documents in response to 
congressional inquiries into the 
Iran initiative.”xxiii  
Found guilty of 
aiding and abetting 
obstruction of 
Congress; sentenced 
to two years 
probation and 
1,200 hours of 
community service 
and fined $150,000; 
vacated on appeal; 
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Shredded and altered paper and 
computer trail regarding 
Iran/contra; repeatedly gave 
false version of Iran/contra 
transactions that exculpated 
himself and the President to 
Congress. 
Convicted of one 
count of conspiring 





Congress, and two 
counts of false 
statements to 
Congress; sentenced 
to six months in 
prison; overturned 















Cooperated with Independent 
Counsel investigation after it 
came to light that he had made 
false statements regarding 
operational aspects of 
Iran/contra activities. 





to 100 hours 
community service; 
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“[W]ithheld from Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee 
and the House Permanent 
Select Committee on 
Intelligence (HPSCI) in 
October 1986 his knowledge of 
North’s contra-assistance 
activities. . . . also admitted that 
he withheld from HPSCI 
information that he had 
solicited $10 million in aid for 
the contras from the Sultan of 
Brunei.”xxx  




Congress under 2 
U.S.C. § 192; 
charges brought by 
Independent 
Counsel Lawrence 
E. Walsh; pardoned; 












Testified about role in 
Iran/contra but denied 
contemporaneous knowledge 
that weapons were being 
shipped or soliciting support 
from third countries. 
Indicted on seven 
counts of perjury 
and false statements 
to congressional and 
presidential 
investigators; 
charges brought by 
Independent 
Counsel Lawrence 
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“[C]harged with falsely denying 
before Congress knowledge of 
who was behind the contra-
resupply operation and the true 
identity of Max Gomez, a 
former CIA operative whose 
real name was Felix Rodriguez 
and whom Hasenfus had 
publicly identified as part of the 
resupply operation. According 
to the charges, George also 
falsely denied contacts with 
retired U.S. Air Force Major 
General Richard V. Secord, who 
was involved in both the Iran 
and contra operations.”xxxvi 
Convicted of one 
count of making 
false statements 
before Congress and 
one count perjury 
before Congress; 
charges brought by 
Independent 
Counsel Lawrence 








Testified, contrary to evidence, 
that he was not a knowing 
participant in Iran/contra and 
withheld from Congress 
relevant personal notes 







Congress, and two 
counts of perjury 
before Congress; 
charges brought by 
Independent 
Counsel Lawrence 
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Lied to the Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs about her 
nomination to the position of 
Assistant Secretary for 
Community Planning and 
Development; “key-player” in 
the department’s use of funds to 
favor “developers willing to pay 
huge fees to lobbyists with 
whom she associated.”xli 
Convicted of four 
counts of false 
statements to 
Congress under  
28 U.S.C. § 1001, 
four counts of 
perjury under  
28 U.S.C. § 1621 
for the same 
statements, and four 
related counts;  
§ 1001 convictions 
reversed on appeal, 















In retaliation against his former 
employers, Horner fabricated a 
memo on Customs Service 
letterhead that suggested the 
Customs Service was aiding 
Mexican drug smugglers; in 
order to convince Senator 
Diane Feinstein to pursue an 
investigation, Horner produced 
additional false affidavits from 
Customs Service officials which 
stated that the original 
document was legitimate.  
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Lied in a written response to the 
Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
which was investigating the 
propriety of his being listed as a 
“special guest” on a campaign 
fundraising letter sent to 
banking officials he regulated 




to 18 months 
probation and a 










Accused of concealing 
information from a Senate 
investigator looking into Jack 
Abramoff’s activities. 
Convicted for 
obstructing a Senate 
proceeding and 
making false 
statements to a 
Senate investigator, 
along with related 
crimes; all counts 











                                                
 i. Meyers v. United States, 171 F.2d 800, 802–03 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
 ii. Id. at 800–02. Convicted of three counts under D.C. CODE § 22-2501 (1940). Id. 
 iii. United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822, 824–25 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 iv. Hiss, 185 F.2d at 824–25. 
 v. The statute of limitations had already run on possible espionage charges. Janny 
Scott, Alger Hiss, Divisive Icon of the Cold War, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at 1, 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D02E0D9143AF935A2575 
2C1A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. Hiss was also charged with and convicted of 
perjury for his later grand jury testimony to the same. Hiss, 185 F.2d at 824–25. 
 vi. Scott, supra note v. 
 vii. D.C. Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146, 147 (D.C. 1975). 
 viii. Id. at 147–50. 
 ix. Id. at 149 n.5 (convicted under 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970)). 
 x. In re Mitchell, 370 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100–01 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Lawrence Meyer, 
John N. Mitchell, Principal in Watergate, Dies at 75, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1988, at A01, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/ 
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stories/mitchobit.htm. 
 xi. Mitchell, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01; Meyer, supra note x. 
 xii. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51-53 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Mitchell was also 
convicted of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503, false statements to a grand jury 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1623, and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Mitchell, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 
100.  
 xiii. JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 74 (1976); Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 106.  
 xiv. Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 52. The related crimes were one count of conspiracy to 
obstruct the investigation into the Watergate cover-up and one count of obstruction of justice. 
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS 535, 836 (Mercer 
Cross et al. eds., 1975); see also Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 51 n.3. 
 xv. Thomas Powers, Inside the Department of Dirty Tricks, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 
1979, at 33, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/flashbks/cia/powers.htm. 
 xvi. Id.; PUB. INTEGRITY SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT 
TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 
FOR 1978, at 4, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/arpt-1978.pdf. 
Investigators contemplated bringing other charges, such as perjury, but it was far from certain 
that they would be able to force Helms to disclose the classified information needed for such a 
conviction. Thus, they offered the two misdemeanor withholding of information counts in 
exchange for no jail time or sentencing. Helms accepted the deal, but the judge felt it 
necessary to impose a stronger sentence, resulting in the jail time and fine. Powers, supra note 
xv. 
 xvii. United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 xviii. Id. at 1268–70. 
 xix. Id. One count under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), one count under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, 
and two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982). Id. at 1271 n.4. Ms. Lavelle bears the 
dubious distinction of being the only executive branch official actually charged for lying to 
Congress under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 between 1955 and 1986. Peter W. Morgan, The 
Underfined Crime of Lying to Congress: Ethics Reform and the Rule of Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 
177, 182 (1992). 1955 marked the first time the Court held § 1001 applied to false statements 
made to any branch of government. 1986 was the date of the first Iran/contra trials. Elkan 
Abramowitz, The Limitation of USC §1001 to the Executive Branch, 214 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1995). 
 xx. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR 
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS, VOLUME I: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 79–104 (1994), 
available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm. 
 xxi. Id. McFarlane was one of six Iran/contra defendants pardoned by President Bush. 
“In recommending the acceptance of this plea of guilty, Independent Counsel gave up the 
opportunity to prosecute McFarlane as a member of the conspiracy to defraud the United 
States by conducting an unauthorized covert activity, for making false statements to Congress, 
and for obstruction of a congressional investigation. The strength of such felony prosecutions 
would lie in the admissions of McFarlane and the documentary proof of memoranda from 
North to McFarlane. In addition, members of the NSC staff could have testified to North's 
direct access to McFarlane, notwithstanding their difference in rank.” Id. However, North and 
Poindexter both refused to testify without immunity, and McFarlane denied all other guilt. 
Additionally, the independent investigator was worried that McFarlane’s trial and testimony 
might disrupt their other prosecutions. McFarlane agreed to cooperate with the investigation 
as part of his plea agreement. Id. 
 xxii. Id. at 105–22, available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm. 
 xxiii. Id. 
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 xxiv. Id. North was originally charged on twelve counts: two counts of obstructing 
Congress, three counts of false statements to Congress, an additional count of obstruction of 
Congress on an aiding and abetting theory, one count of obstructing a presidential inquiry, 
one additional count of false statements (to the presidential investigator), one count of 
shredding and altering official documents, accepting an illegal gratuity, conversion of traveler’s 
checks, and one conspiracy to defraud the United States. The major conspiracy charges had to 
be dropped due to information classification issues. In addition to the aiding and abetting 
obstruction count, North was also found guilty of shredding and altering official documents 
and accepting an illegal gratuity. North was not given prison time because the sentencing 
judge felt that probation and community service would be more effective, but this also gave 
North little incentive to cooperate with the ongoing independent investigation. On appeal, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that North’s trial had been tainted by the immunized 
congressional testimony he had given on national television and vacated the convictions. Id. 
 xxv. Id. at 123–36, available at  http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_03.htm. 
 xxvi. Id. Poindexter was originally indicted on seven counts. Two conspiracy charges were 
dropped due to the confidential information required for conviction. His conviction was 
overturned on appeal because his trial had been tainted by earlier immunized testimony and 
other grounds. Id. 
 xxvii. Id. at 263–86, available at  http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_19.htm. 
 xxviii. Id. Fiers’ plea was part of a testimony agreement. Id. 
 xxix. In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 6 (D.C. 1997). 
 xxx. WALSH, supra note xx, at 375–92. 
 xxxi. Abrams, 689 A.2d at 9, 19. 
 xxxii. Id. at 6–9. 
 xxxiii. WALSH, supra note xx, at 247–62. 
 xxxiv. Id. “On November 26, 1991, a federal Grand Jury indicted Clarridge on seven 
counts of perjury and false statements to congressional investigators and to the President's 
Special Review Board (the Tower Commission) stemming from his testimony about his role in 
the November 1985 arms shipment to Iran.” Id. Counts one through three charged perjury 
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under 28 U.S.C. § 1621. Count four 
charged perjury before the House Permanent Select Committee. Count five charged false 
statements before the president’s Tower Commission. Count six charged perjury before the 
Select Iran/contra Committees. Count seven charged false statements in a deposition before 
the staff of the Select Iran/contra Committees. Clarridge was pardoned before trial along with 
five others. Id. 
 xxxv. Id. at 233–46. 
 xxxvi. Id. 
 xxxvii. Id. George was initially indicted by a grand jury on ten felony counts of perjury, 
false statements, and obstruction of Congressional and grand jury investigations. Three 
obstruction counts were then dropped after the narrow construal of the statute in the 
Poindexter case. Several months later, George was indicted by a grand jury of two 
supplemental counts. Nine counts were brought to trial: two counts of false statements to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), two counts of obstructing Congress, two 
additional counts of false statements to the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence (HPSCI), perjury before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), 
obstructing a grand jury investigation, and perjury before a grand jury. The first trial resulted 
in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict regarding any count. The 
independent investigator then dropped the two obstruction counts and some of the charged 
false statements where more than one statement was charged as false. The jury returned a 
guilty verdict as to one of the counts of false statements before the HPSCI and the perjury 
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count before the SSCI. George was pardoned, along with five others, a month before 
sentencing. Id. 
 xxxviii. Id. at 405–42. 
 xxxix. Id. Weinberger was also indicted on one count of perjury to the Office of 
Independent Council and the FBI. He was pardoned before his CIPA issues could  
be litigated. Id. 
 xl. United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 xli. Id. at 646. 
 xlii. Id. “On July 7, 1992, a grand jury returned a thirteen-count indictment against 
Dean. The indictment charged Dean with three counts of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371, one count of accepting an illegal gratuity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B), four 
counts of perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, and five counts of concealment and false 
statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The district court dismissed one of the counts 
brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. On October 26, 1993, a jury found Dean guilty of the 
twelve remaining counts.” Id. at 644. Before Dean’s appeal the Supreme Court decided 
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995), which held that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 did not 
apply to statements made before Congress. Thus, these convictions were overturned. The 
single 18 U.S.C. § 1621 count, which was reversed on factual grounds. Id. at 644, 658–66. 
Hubbard’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was later superseded by statute in 1996. See 
United States v. Butler, 351 F. Supp. 2d 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 xliii. PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS OF THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 
2000, at 20 (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/arpt-2000.pdf. 
 xliv. Id. Horner also pled guilty to giving false information to the FBI. Id. 
 xlv. PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS OF THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 
2005, at 22-23 (2006) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 2005 REPORT], available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/arpt-2005.pdf. 
 xlvi. PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC 
INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2006, at 18–19 (2007) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 
2006 REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/arpt-2006.pdf.  
 xlvii. Id. Safavian was also convicted of obstructing a GSA inquiry, making false 
statements, or withholding information from, a GSA inspector general investigator and GSA 
ethics officials. Id.; PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 2005 REPORT, supra note xlv, at 25–26. The 
GSA counts were later reversed because it was not clear that Safavian had a legal duty to 
disclose his activities to the GSA. The counts before Congress were also reversed because the 
appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion in “excluding favorable expert 
testimony” regarding the meaning Safavian might have attached to jargon used in his 
testimony. United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 966 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 xlviii. PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 2006 REPORT, supra note xlvi, at 18–19; Safavian, 
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